@book{deon91, Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{meyer91deontic, Abstract = {In this paper we shall give a short (and incomplete) historic overview of the branche of modal logic that is concerned with (reasoning about) norms and normative behaviour, viz. deontic logic. Typically, deontc logic has operators for deontic / normative modalities such as prohibition, permission and obligation. The paper is meant as an introduction to the more advanced papers presented in DEON'91}, Author = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {2--14}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Deontic Logic: A Concise Overview}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{meyer91applications, Abstract = {Deontic logic is the logic that deals with actual as well as ideal behaviour of systems. In this paper, we survey a number of applications of deontic logic in computer science that have arisen in the eighties, and give a systematic framework in which these applications can be classified. Many applications move in the direction of programming a computer in deontic logic to make the computer prohibit, permit or obligate people to do something. We discuss conditions under which this possibility is realistic and conditions under which it would be admissible to do so.}, Author = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {15--43}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Applications of Deontic Logic in Computer Science: A Concise Overview}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{alchourron91philosophical, Abstract = {Only two of the main philosophical problems of deontic logic will be dealt with here. 1) First the question whether deontic sentences have or lack truth values. 2) Second the question whether it is needed to have formalisms for conditional defeasible norms (prima facie obligations and permissions) and the impact of the question on the general subject of the admissibility of non-monotonic logics. Finally I comment on the problem of how the preceding philosophical observations have incidence on the practical computational problem of knowledge representation of norms in the field of law. To discuss the philosophical questions (question 1) and 2)) two deontic logics are presented by means of a syntactic and a corresponding possible worlds semantic approach backed with their intuitive justifications. One of the logics is designed to give expression to the conceptual import of normative propositions, i.e. the meaning of deontic sentences used to assert the existence or nonexistence of norms. The other is a logic for norms, i.e., the meaning of deontic sentences used to regulate and evaluate human behavior. It is hold: a) that normative propositions have but norms do not have truth values, b) that their corresponding logics are different unless the system created by the competent authorities is consistent and complete (a case in which both logics become isomorphic). The notion of defeasible (prima facie) conditional norm requires the rejection of the rule of strengthening the antecedent (the mirror image of the nonmonotonicity of a consequence relation) and the abandonement of the rule of detachment which makes impossible to apply the norm in practical everyday situations. The two notions that characterize a defeasible conditional, i.e. a) a classical (monotonic) notion of consequence and b) a theory of change (expansion, contraction and revision) of premisses should not be mixed up in the way it has been done in order  to present defeasible conditionals and nonmonotonic logics on pain of concealing important distinctions and functions. For the practical computational problem of representing the law many of the theoretical distinctions discussed above may be left aside for more often than not they are not relevant to the problem at hand. Nevertheless it is fundamental to have a clear idea of the nature of the distinctions left aside.}, Author = {C. E. Alchourron}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {44}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Philosophical foundations of Deontic Logic and Its Practical Applications in Computational Contexts}, Year = {1991}, Note ={Invited lecture.}
}
@inproceedings{hilpinen91actions, Abstract = {Normative concepts have been formalized in deontic logic (i) as operators which turn certain descriptive propositions (for example, propositions about actions) into norms or normative propositions, or (ii) as operators which turn action terms or predicates (act-descriptions) into normative propositions. The so-called standard deontic logic represents the former approach, whereas G. H. von Wright's first system, Hector-Neri Castaneda's deontic logic, and the systems of deontic logic based on dynamic logic follow the second approach. This paper compares the merits of the two approaches, with particular attention to Hector-Neri Castaneda's work.}, Author = {R. Hilpinen}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {45}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Actions in Deontic Logic}, Year = {1991}, Note ={Invited lecture.}
}
@inproceedings{maibaum91deontics, Abstract = {The normative concepts which deontic logic studies have significant applications in computing. The intention may be to deal with seemingly different issues, such as causality and sequencing in multi-component (agent) systems. Or the intention may be to deal with more obviously normative issues such as fault tolerance or security. Further, the formalization of normative concepts in the setting of the new logics grown in computing is an interesting development which may contribute significantly to deontic logic itself.}, Author = {T. S. E. Maibaum}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {46}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Actions in Deontic Logic}, Year = {1991}, Note ={Invited lecture.}
}
@inproceedings{wright91foundations, Abstract = {No abstract given.}, Author = {T. S. E. Maibaum}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {The foundations of deontic logic a critical survey}, Year = {1991}, Note ={Invited lecture.}
}
@inproceedings{allen91ahohfeld, Abstract = {The A-Hohfeld language is presented as a set of definitions; it can be used to precisely express legal norms. The usefulness of the A-Hohfeld language is illustrated in articulating 2560 alternative structural interpretations of the four-sentence 1982 Library Regulations of Imperial College and constructing an Interpretation-Assistance legal expert system for these regulations by means of the general-purpose Interpretation-Assistance legal expert system builder called MINT. The logical basis for A-Hohfeld is included as an appendix.}, Author = {Layman E. Allen and Charles S. Saxon}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {52--71}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {A-\text{Hohfeld} : A Language for Robust Structural Representation of Knowledge in the Legal Domain to Build Interpretation-Assistance Expert Systems}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{bailhache91authorities, Abstract = {Today, absolute deontic logic with a unique operator O (``it is obligatory that") and its dual P(``it is permitted that") is out-of-date. I propose to improve deontic logic with using operators indexed on two kinds of individuals: authorities and addressees. First, each of them are dealt with directly from intuition, and axiomatical systems, with their corresponding semantics, are built. At this stage, as in the whole article, an essential procedure consists in working on sets of individuals, not merely on individuals. Then I introduce an elementary logic of action, so that emanating a norm and being touched by a norm are respectively considered as making an absolute norm and being normed to do something. New systems, more complicated, result from this analysis}, Author = {Patrice Bailhache}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {72--88}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Authorities and addressees in Deontic Logic: Indexed Operators and Action}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{bartha91conditional, Abstract = {A variant of Belbap's stit-semantics due to Horty and von Kutschera is used to provide a semantics of obligation. This semantics is used to discuss conditional obligation as well as some of the paradoxes of deontic logic. The paper argues for the importance of an analysis of agency for deontic logic.}, Author = {Paul Bartha}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {89--106}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Conditional Obligation and the Logic of Agency}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{belnap91realm, Abstract = {Stit theory (a logic of seeing-to-it that) is applied to cases involving many agents. First treated are complex nestings of stits involving distinct agents. The discussion is driven by the logical impossibility of ``a sees to it that b sees to it that Q" in the technical sense, even though that seems to make sense in everyday language. Of special utility are the concepts of ``forced choice", of the creation of deontic states, and of probabilities. Second, joint agency, both plain and strict (every participant is essential) is given a rigorous treatment. A central theorem is that strict joint agency is itself agentive.}, Author = {Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {107--126}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {In the Realm of Agents}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{bibier91computer, Abstract = {With respect to confidentiality, a computer security policy defines what information stored in a computer users have the permission to know. We propose to express these policies with an epistemic and deontic logic. In this context, confidentiality is defined by the formula $K_A \phi \rightarrow R_A \phi$ that could be read ``if A knows $\phi$ then A should have the permission to know $\phi$". We provide a new possible-worlds semantics for the $R_A$ operator that depends on the security policy to be modeled. Finally, we express within our framework three examples of security policies.}, Author = {Pierre Bieber and Frederic Cuppens}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {127--141}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Computer Security Policies for Deontic Logic}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{brown91preferences, Abstract = {This paper is an attempt to clear the following charge leveled against preference logics: preference logics rest upon the mistaken belief that concept construction can satisfactorily be carried out in isolation from theory construction [15]. We construct a logic of preference that is fundamental in the sense that it does not commit itself to any allegedly obvious or intuitive ---and in actuality, theory specific--- preference principles. A unique feature of our construction is that preferences orderings are placed upon possible worlds. While this has been done before in the work of [16] [10], among others, we do not derive a binary preference relation ---from these orders--- that acts on individual propositions. Instead, we provide the syntactic means to impose the preference orderings among worlds. Thus, unlike [10] [11], we do not need to assume a priori that our preference orderings be transitive. Such properties can be axiomatized. The close connections between preferences and obligations, in particular, their normative nature, them, allows us to derive a deontic logic that is free of the paradoxes of standard deontic logic. It is interesting to note here, that this work arose in an attempt to provide a logical characterization of document description and layout. Layout directives can be succintly represented as preference criteria.}, Author = {Allen L. Brown and Surya Mantha and Toshiro Wakayama}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {142--163}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Preferences as Normative Knowledge: Towards Declarative Obligations}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{coenen91specifying, Abstract = {Fault tolerant systems are, like most complex systems, structured in layers. In a fault tolerant layered system, a malfunction on  lower level layer occurs at a higher level as an imperfection, that may prohibit the upper layer from exhibiting its preferred behaviour. The behaviour of a system in such less than perfect circumstances should not be left unspecified. Deontic logic offers the possibility to specify layered fault tolerant systems in a natural way. More specifically, dyadic modalities are used to specify the preferred behaviours of a fault tolerant system in different conditions. The use of dyadic rather than monadic modalities is also discussed in the context of a particular problem that arises when specifying fault tolerant systems and which is referred to as the `lazy programmer' paradox. The `lazy programmer' paradox is illustrated by a few `toy' examples. The application of deontic logic as a specification language for fault tolerant systems is illustrated by the specification of a non-trivial example.}, Author = {J. Coenen}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {164--178}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Specifying Fault Tolerant Programs in Deontic Logic}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{dubois91use, Abstract = {In this paper we propose to use deontic logic for expressing and reasoning on specifications elaborated during the initial requirements engineering phase of the software lifecycle. During this phase, we need to capture descriptions of `composite systems' (i.e. systems including manual procedures, hardware devices and software components) and to be able to check that the different interactions taking place between the components are valid with respect to some global goals assigned to the system considered as a whole. To support this activity, we introduce a formal real-time temporal language augmented with some deontic capabilities.}, Author = {Eric Dubois}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {179--194}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Use of Deontic Logic in the Requirements Engineering of Composite Systems}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{hage91consistency, Abstract = {In this paper a theory about the consistency of rules is developed. The paper starts with initial circumscription of rule consistency, which is gradually refined, until it takes account of the differences between alethic and deontic consistency, and the differences between consistency from distinct points o view.}, Author = {Jaap Hage}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {195--211}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Consistency of Rules}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{horty91moral, Abstract = {No abstract given.}, Author = {John F. Horty}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {212--231}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Moral dilemmas and Nonmonotonic Logic}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{jones91logic, Abstract = {We outline the approach to the analysis of deontic conditionals taken in our earlier work, compare it briefly with two main trends within dyadic deontic logic, and then discuss problems associated with the augmentation principle and the factual detachment principle. We then modify our previous system, using a classical but not normal (in the sense of Chellas) deontic modality to provide the basis for an alternative analysis of deontic conditionals. This new analysis validates neither the factual detachment nor the augmentation principles. However, influenced by the approach of James Delgrande to default reasoning, we show how a restricted form of factual detachment may be accomodated within our revised system. Finally, we mention a quite different kind of apprach, in which conditionship is seen not as an operation but as a relation. This paper is a report of work in progress.}, Author = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Ingmar P\"orn}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {232--247}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {On the Logic of Deontic Conditionals}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{jones91role, Abstract = {Two topics dominate this paper: the role of deontic logic in knowledge representation in the legal domain; and the role of deontic logic in the specification of computer systems. In both cases, we take the library regulations at Imperial College as an illustrative example. The essential point for which we then argue is that deontic logic ---in some form or other--- needs to be taken seriously as soon as one is forced to make explicit the distinction between what ought to be the case and what is the case, or so we also say, between the ideal and the actual. In conclusion we touch on the role of deontic logic in the development of the theory of normative positions ---a theory which is of relevance both to the legal knowledge representation and computer system specification. Our overall aim in this paper is to sketch the beginnings of a methodology for the use of deontic logic in the analysis and representation of normative systems.}, Author = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {248--261}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {On the Role of Deontic Logic in the Characterization of Normative Systems}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{kwast91deontic, Abstract = {The logical content of integrity constraints can be expressed by means of predicate formulas, but this obscures the difference between data, queries and constraints. Kripke semantics provides a natural solution. Integrity constraints do not express facts about the actual instance, but describe the acceptable instances of the database scheme, among which we hope to find the actual one. A new deontic operator X, denoting `what should hold', is presented to describe the logic of integrity constraints in a relational database. The suitability of the operator to model integrity is shown by its application in the context of databases with nulls.}, Author = {Karen L. Kwast}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {262--280}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {A Deontic Operator for Database Integrity}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{moffett91distributed, Abstract = {This paper describes some aspects of management policies which could be modeled as objects in a distributed computer system. The motivation for this is to enable their automation, but to do this safely it is necessary to describe them formally in order to be able to reason about them. The aim of the paper is to describe distributed system management policies and then raise the question whether deontic logic might be a suitable vehicle for their formal description. Policies, the plans of an organization to meet its goals, are persistent entities which are intended to influence actions. A distinction is made between policies that motivate actions and those which authorize them. Policies have several characteristics: they are directed to subjects; they are typically organized in hierarchies; and a number of potentially conflicting policies may apply to a single possible action, so that they require to have a preference ordering. We describe an ad hoc formal approach to modeling policy, using the Z specification language, and then examine some existing approaches using deontic logic. Finally we set out a shopping list of the desirable characteristics of a logic for modeling management policies.}, Author = {Jonathan D. Moffett}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {281--293}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Distributed System Management Policies: an Application for Deontic Logic}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{morris91security, Abstract = {There are acknowledge problems in specifying security requirements for complex information processing systems. Even the ``simple" notion of access rights is not well understood. In this paper we develop a normative framework for establishing and specifying access rights to a file. It will be suggested that there are 26 different relationships, that there is a practical and simple procedure for determining which relationship each agent stands in to a file, and that this approach enables us to carry out useful checks on the specification. The need for, and the use of, these ideas is illustrated by means of an example from the processing of medical health records.}, Author = {Philip Morris and John McDermid}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {294--314}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Security and Normative Rights}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{prakken91reasoning, Abstract = {This paper presents a formal theory about nontrivial reasoning with inconsistent but hierarchically structured normative information. The theory is based on the observation that the way legal rules are made subject to orderings gives them a defeasible character. For this reason approaches based on standard logic, such as belief revision, are inappropriate as a formal framework for reasoning with ordered norms. Consequently, a nonmonotonic logic, default logic, is chosen as the underlying formalism for a definition of a hierarchically preferred argument. On the basis of this definition two alternative notions of nontrivial consequence from inconsistent knowledge are defined and compared with each other. One application of the formal framework is an alternative analysis of the deontic concepts ``conflict of duties" and ``defeasible obligation".}, Author = {Henry Prakken}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {315--334}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Reasoning with Normative Hierarchies}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{ryan91towards, Abstract = {We show how the normative behaviour of a system can be specified by hierarchies of constraints, in a way that allows the specifier to reason about the system's behaviour when it falls outside those constraints. We call such hierarchies structured theory presentations and show that they arise naturally from structured specifications. Structured theory presentations are an alternative to deontic logic for specifying norms.}, Author = {Marc Ryan}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {335--346}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Towards Specifying Norms}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{ryu91defeasible, Abstract = {Our interests are in the application of deontic logic for the modeling of regulations in commercial law and other social institutions. We provide a first-order framework of deontic reasoning that can model and compute social regulations and rules. This effort is practically important due to the ubiquity and complexity of social regulations and norms. Computer-mediated modeling norms may reduce the overhead of managing complex social norms and avoid inefficiencies and social inequity resulting from complex and ill-maintained social norms. In order to achieve the goal, we apply defeasible reasoning, a Horn-clausal form logic programming approach, and capture deontic concepts in first-order representations. A rule-based expert system of defeasible reasoning is currently under development. The proposed formalism may be applied for the modeling of normative systems such as bureaucratic regulations and legal reasoning.}, Author = {Young U. Ryu and Ronald M. Lee}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {347--363}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {Towards Specifying Norms}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{santos91deontic, Abstract = {The obligations issued by contracts may be seen as specification of legally desirable behaviours. It was on the basis of this idea that the concept of obligation in the Civil Law Systems of Contracts Law was explored. We can interpret these kind of obligations as obligations to fulfil promises by behaving in a certain way. In the presented deontic logics,  the obligation operators refer directly to some of the mentioned elements of the General Obligation Theory (Contracts Law), namely what should be done for the fulfillment of a duty and the circumstantial and temporal aspects which are relevant to determine the circumstances needed to fulfil an obligation. The basic semantic concept of the proposed logic is the notion of behaviour: a sequence of atomic actions executed from a state of affairs. Different deontic operators are discussed and their relationships are analyzed from the point of view of their fulfilment and or/violation.}, Author = {Filipe Santos and Jose Carmo}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {364--382}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {A Deontic Logical Representation of Contractual Obligations}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{weigand91modelling, Abstract = {Deontic rules play an important role in conceptual modeling. It has been suggested that deontic logic is therefore a necessary part of a modelling language. However, deontic rules typically concern the interaction of different agents in the domain. It is shown that this interaction can also be modelled, and more transparently, in the form of communication structures, based on illocutionary logic. These communication structures can be organized in an object-oriented way by means of ``contracts". This allows for sharing of general rules by means of inheritance. Deontic operators can be defined in terms of the illocutionary primitives, so that a deontic logic can be given as well, on the top of the illocutionary logic.}, Author = {Hans Weigand}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 1st International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1991), Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 11-13, 1991},  Editor = {{\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa}, Keywords = {deon91}, Pages = {383}, Publisher = {Informal Proceedings}, Title = {A Deontic Logical Representation of Contractual Obligations}, Year = {1991}
}
@inproceedings{royakkers94towards,Abstract = {In this paper we introduce a new deontic logic $P_{re}D_{e}L$ (Predicative Deontic Logic), an extension of the system $PD_{e}L$, based upon ideas derived from Meyer. This extension includes the addition of actors and conditions under which an actor executes an action. The addition of actors and conditions allows us to express who has the responsibility to execute an action under which conditions. The system $P_{re}D_{e}L$ has been developed to formalize sections in law, especially the Dutch traffic regulation. At the end of hte paper we will see an example of the formalization of the speed-limit of the Dutch traffic regulation.},Author = {Lamber Royakkers},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:53:17 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:54:21 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {319--332},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Towards a Deontic Logic Approach to Legal Rules},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{prakken94two,Abstract = {This paper compares two ways of formalizing deeasible deontic reasoning, both based on the view that the issues of conflicting obligations and moral dilemmas should be dealt with froma a nonmonotonic perspective. The first way is developing a special nonmonotonic logic for deontic statements. This methods turns out to have some limitations, for which reason another approach is proposed, viz. combining an already existing nonmonotonic logic with a deontic logic. As an example of this method the language of Reiter's default logic is extended to include modal expressions, after which the argumentation framework in default logic of Prakken (1993a/b) is used to give a plausible nonmonotonic analysis of conflicting obligations.},Author = {Henry Prakken},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:47:17 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:47:17 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {281--295},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Two Approaches to Defeasible Reasoning},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{prakken94contrary,Abstract = {This paper investigates under what conditions contrary-to-duty structures lacking temporal elements can be given a coherent reading. A negative result is that methods of nonmonotonic reasoning are inadequate, since they are unable to distinguish between defeasibility and violability of primary obligations. On the positive side, this paper proposes a semantic framework based on the idea that primary and contrary-to-duty obligations are obligations of different kinds, in that they pertain to different contexts. A crucial aspect of this idea is that, although a context may violate some obligations, it should still measure ip to the ideal worlds as much as possible. The framework has many desirable features but it also contains a major flaw. Identification of the source of the problem suggests a similarity between contrary-to-duty reasoning on the one hand and theory revision and defeasible reasoning on the other.},Author = {Henry Prakken and Marek Sergot},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:40:34 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:48:38 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {296--318},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Contrary-to-duty imperatives, defeasibility and violability},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{ong94detecting,Abstract = {Bureaucratic rules can be modeled using deontic logic and such formalization will facilitate the automation of these rules. Unfortunately, if these rules re not well designed, they can create a form of inconsistency that we call deontic dilemmas. Normally, deontic dilemmas can only be detected when the rules are being applied to some situations. In this paper, we propose the use of a form of plausible reasoning called abduction for detecting potential deontic dilemmas in generated hypothetical scenarios. The goal is to detect these deontic dilemmas in these future scenarios so as to repair the rules before they are used. In addition, we also introduce the notion of contingent abduction that allows abduction to be performed conditionally based on the deontic status. This facilitates the definition and exploration of deontically obedient scenarios as well as scenarios with deontic violations and satisfactions.},Author = {KayLiang Ong and Ronald M. Lee},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:29:02 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:35:26 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {252--280},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Detecting Deontic Dilemmas in Bureaucratic Rules: A First-Order Implementation Using Abduction},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{merin94from,Abstract = {Civil procedure turns on acts of claim, concession, denial, and retraction with respect to social commitments: both in the boulomaic-deontic ('demand') and the epistemic-alethic ('assertion') domain. I represent in finite state automat a paradigmatic 2-person binary issue of negotiation about joint commitment. A procedural semantics associates  acts one-one with their target states. A denotational semantics for states as vectors of decision-theoretic parameters yields a translation group. Act-types and their transformations are represented by quotient algebras. A functor to the familiar Deontic Square reveals differences in characteristic order relations of preference and entailment and raises questions about models of deontic and assertion logics.},Author = {Arthur Merin},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:23:05 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:23:05 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {198--220},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {From Civil Procedure to Deontic Modality},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{morreau94prima,Abstract = {Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, which attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for these principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us find out what we ought to do. After formalizing general prima-facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies; burnt offerings, and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima-facie principles are overridden by more spcific ones.},Author = {Michael Morreau},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:14:43 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:34:59 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {221--251},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Prima Facie and Seeming Duties},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{mcnamara94doing,Abstract = {On the traditional deontic framework, what is required (what morality demands) and what is ideal (what morality recommends) can't be distinguished and hence they can't both be represented. Although the morally optional can be represented, the supererogatory, one of its proper subclasses, cannot be. The morally indifferent, another proper subclass of the optional--one obviously disjoint from the supererogatory--is also not representable. Similarly for the permissibly supoptimal and the morally significant. Finally, the minimum that morality allows finds no place in the traditional scheme. So the traditional scheme is radically incomplete. With a focus on the question, "What would constitute a hospitable logical neighborhood for the concept of supererogation?", I present and motivate an enriched logical and semantic framework for representing all these concepts of common sense morality.},Author = {Paul McNamara},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 15:08:12 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:09:47 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {165--197},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common Sense Morality},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{lockhorst94extensional,Abstract = {We will show that formal theories about the deontic status of actions can quite well be formulated in terms of the standard two-sorted first-order extensional predicate calculus. The resulting logical system are much easier to implement than the modal accounts of the deontic logic of action which are currently popular. A prototype implementation of a first-order extensional deontic logic of action (R.M. Lee's expert shell DX) is briefly described.},Author = {Gert-Jan C. Lockhorst},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:59:41 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 15:06:01 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {145--164},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Extensional Deontic Logics of Action and Their Implementation},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{gasquet94automated,Abstract = {This paper addresses the problem of automated deduction for such logics. For many of them, we solve the problem by exhibiting a sound and complete translation from non-normal modal logics into normal multi-modal logics for which efficient proof methods have been devised in the last years. This allow the possibility of a real use of such logics in the field of Deontic Logic.},Author = {Olivier Gasquet and Andreas Herzig},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:49:23 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:50:58 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {136--144},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Automated Deduction for Non-Normal Modal Logics},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{cuppens94roles,Abstract = {The objective of this paper is to propose a new semantics for a class of normative positions that applies deontic operators to descriptions of possible act-positions. This semantics is based on the concept of role which represents a behavior an agent is authorized to play. Within this new semantics, we investigate several deontic problems such as the treatment of Chisholm's Paradox, moral dilemmas and defeasibl reasoning.},Author = {Frederic Cuppens},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:42:08 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:42:08 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {86--106},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Roles and Deontic Logic},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{dignum94contextual,Abstract = {In this paper, we give a solution to the Free Choice Paradox. This is done in two stages. First, we have a close look at the logical interpretation of the natural language statements that lead to the paradox. This leads to making the important distinction of permitting an action in isolationor permitting it in combination with some or any other action, i.e., in a certain context. This distinction is made formal by the introduction of a new operator on actions, which forces them to be performed in isolation. With this distinction made clear it is possible to give a "new" stronger definition for the permission operator, which solves the Free Choice Paradox and which does not lead to any new inconsistencies or paradoxes.},Author = {Frank Dignum and {\text{J.-J. Ch.}} Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:37:42 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:47:21 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {107--135},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Contextual Permission: A Solution to the Free Choice Paradox},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{carmo94deontic,Abstract = {The paper discusses the potential value of a deontic approach to database specification. More specifically, some different types of integrity constraints are considered and a distinction is drawn between necessary ("hard") and deontic ("soft") constraints. Databases are compared with other normative systems. A deontic logic for database specification is proposed, and is compared to some other systems of deontic logic. The recovery problem is discussed in the context of this logic. The limitations of the proposed logic and possible modifications and extensions of it are analyzed.},Author = {Jos{\'e} Carmo and Andrew J. I. Jones},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:31:40 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:33:06 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {56--85},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Deontic Database Constraints and the Characterization of Recovery},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{ahser94prima,Abstract = {This paper presents a nonmonotonic deontic logic based on commonsense entailment. It establishes criteria a successful account of obligation should satisfy, and develops a theory that satisfies them. The theory includes two conditional notions of prima facie obligation. One is constitutive; the other is epistemic, and follows nonmonotonically from the constitutive notion. The paper defines unconditional notions of prima facie obligation in terms of the conditional notions.},Author = {Nicolas Asher and Daniel Bonevac},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:25:16 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:25:33 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {19--36},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Prima Facie Obligation},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@book{deon94,Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:20:57 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:25:09 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{brown94logic,Abstract = {Normal systems of modal logic, interpreted as deontic logics, are unsuitable for a logic of conflicting obligations. By using modal operators based on a a more complex semantics, however, we can provide for conflicting obligations, as in van Fraassen [1973] and Brown [1988]. Having gone that far, it becomes desirable to be able to express and consider claims about the comparative strengths, or degrees of urgency, of the conflicting obligations under which we stand. Thsi paper, building on the logic of ability in Brown [1988], provides a decidable and complete system for such a language.},Author = {Mark A. Brown},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1994), Oslo, Norway, January 6-8, 1994},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:16:13 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:26:41 +0200},Editor = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Marek Sergot},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon94},Pages = {37--55},Publisher = {Tano},Series = {Complex},Title = {A Logic of Comparative Obligation},Volume = {1/94},Year = {1994}
}
@inproceedings{cuppens96deontic,Abstract = {This paper presents a deontic logic $\Sigma$ for reasoning about permission or prohibition to know some parts of the database content in the context of a multilevel confidentiality policy. The most important logical features in the definition of a multi-level policy are that each confidentiality level is defined by a set of sentences and that, when the policy is designed, the permission to know is not necessarily the complement of the prohibition to know. These concepts are formalized in a modal logic where deontic modalities, doxastic modalities and confidentiality levels are interpreted by non-standard modal models. The corresponding axiomatics is also presented in the paper and its soundness and completeness have been proved. A limitation of the $\Sigma$ logic is that sentences in the scope of modalities are sentences of Propositional Calculus. Finally, it is shown how the logic can be used to express constraints to guarantee the consistency of a policy or to prevent the existence of inference channels. That is, the possibility to infer sentences that are not permitted to know from other sentences that are permitted to know. Both deductive and abductive channels are considered.},Author = {Frederic Cuppens and Robert Demolombe},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 14:07:11 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:07:11 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {66--79},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {A Deontic Logic for Reasoning about Confidentiality},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{tan96how,Abstract = {In this paper we propose a semantics for dyadic deontic logic with an explicit preference ordering between worlds, representing different degrees of ideality. We argue that this ideality ordering can be used in two ways to evaluate formulas, which we call ordering and minimizing. Ordering uses all preference relations between worlds, whereas minimizing uses the most preferred worlds only. We show that ordering corresponds to strengthening of the antecedent, and minimizing to weakening of the consequent. Moreover, we show that in some cases ordering and minimizing have to be combined to obtain certain desirable conclusions, and that this can only be done in a so-called two-phase deontic logic. In the first phase, the preference ordering is constructed, and in the second phase the ordering is used for minimization. If these two phases are not distinguished, then counterintuitive conclusions follow.},Author = {Yao-Hua Tan and Leendert W. N. van der Torre},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 13:58:02 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 13:59:28 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {216--232},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {How to Combine Ordering and Minimizing in a Deontic Logic Based on Preferences},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{santos96indirect,Abstract = {In this paper a new action concept is proposed, within the same tradition of the logical characterization of act descriptions as employed by Kanger, P\"{o}rn and Lindahl. The concept sums up a successful goal oriented social activity into a unique assertion referring to the agent who has initiated it. It is argued that this notion allows us to increase the expressiveness of the characterization of agents' activity within organizations. For describing the agents' interaction the normative systems perspective is adopted, viewing such interactions as governed by norms and expressing them in terms of what agents are premitted and obliged to do. In this context, the new concept allows us to cope with normative descriptions that play an important role in organizations: responsibilities. The minima properties of this ``indirect" agency operator are discussed, and an ``influence" operator is also introduced in order to cope with interactions between the different agents. The interest of these concepts within the analysis and specification of organizations is illustrated.},Author = {Filipe Santos and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 13:50:43 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 13:52:33 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {194--215},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Indirect Action, Influence and Responsibility},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{royakkers96defeasible,Abstract = {The last few years several defeasible deontic reasoning formalisms are developed as a way to solve the problem of deontic inconsistency. However, these formalisms are unable to deal with some very common forms of deontic reasoning, since e.g. their expressiveness is restricted. In this paper we will establish a priority hierarchy of legal rules to solve the problem of deontic conflucts and we will give a mechanism to reason about nonmonotonicity of legal rules over the priority hierarchy. The theory presented here, based on defaylt logic and a modification and extension of the argumentation framework of Prakken, properly deals with some shortcomings of other defeasible deontic reasoning approaches.},Author = {Lamber Royakkers and Frank Dignum},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 13:39:34 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 13:47:25 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {174--193},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Defeasible Reasoning with Legal Rules},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{krogh96getting,Abstract = {The contribution of this paper lies in the analysis of the relationship between impersonal and personal deontic notions, keeping them as close to standard deontic logic as possible. In doing so, we offer arguments against reducing both personal notions to impersonal notions, and impersonal notions to personal notions. We discover that we need to introduce two new notions of impersonal obligation and permission. Finally we argue in favour of one particular representation of ought-to-do and permitted-to-do statements.},Author = {Christen Krogh and Henning Herrestad},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:57:55 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:57:55 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {134--153},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Getting Personal: Some Notes on the Relationship Between Personal and Impersonal Obligation},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{mcnamara96must,Abstract = {Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power, thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track.},Author = {Paul McNamara},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:50:57 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:59:34 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {154--173},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Must I Do what I Ought? (or Will the Least I can Do Do?)},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{johanson96logic,Abstract = {This paper exploits the properties of adjointness to develop a theory of norms. The adjoints are a pair of mappings between two logics, one called IMP, a logic of imperatives, and another called PROP, which is ordinary logic. In particular, L is a mapping from PROP to IMP and it has a right adjoint R from IMP to PROP. Norms are defined, formally, as statements that contain occurrences of RU where U is in IMP. A simple theorem (reminiscent of Kant's ``ought implies can"): Responsibility implies power and, moreover, incapacity implies immunity.},Author = {Arnold A. Johanson},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:45:07 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:45:49 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {123--133},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {The Logic of Normative Systems},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{horty96combining,Abstract = {The paper of this paper is to explore a new deontic operator for representing what an agent ought to do; the operator is cast against the background of a modal treatment of action developed by Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff, which itself relies on Arthur Prior's indeterministic tense logic. The analysis developed here of what an agent ought to do is based on a dominance ordering adapted from the decision theoretic study of choice under uncertainty to the present account of action. It is shown that this analysis gives rise to a normal deontic operator, and that the result is superior to an analysis that identifies what an agent ought to do with what it ought to be that the agent does.},Author = {John F. Horty},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:28:12 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:38:42 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {98--122},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Combining Agency and Obligation (Preliminary Version)},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{brown96doing,Abstract = {This paper investigates diachronic deontic logic, based on models with forward-branching time. Using such models, supplemented by a choice function to model human agancy, and an obligation function to introduce normative features, it is possible to develop a rich language with tense logic, since and untill operators, and operators expressing action, ability, and obligation. It then becomes possible to model, not only the interrelationships among our obligations, but also their interrelationships with the actions which give rise to them, the actions which fulfill them, and the abilities these actions require.},Author = {Mark A. Brown},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:15:16 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:15:16 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {47--65},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Doing as we ought: Towards a logic of simply dischargeable obligations},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{dignum96modal,Abstract = {In this paper we introduce some new operators into our framework that make it possible to reason about decisions and commitments to do actions. In our framework, a decision leads to an intention to do an action. The decision in itself does not change the state of the world, but only the relation to possible future worlds. A commitment to actually perform the intended action changes the deontic state of the world such that the intended action becomes obligated. Of course, the obligated action may never actually occur. In our semantic structure, we use static (ought-to-be) and dynamic (ought-to-do) obligation operators. The static operator resembles the classical conception of obligation as truth in ideal worlds, wxcept that it takes the current state as well as the past history of the world into account. This is necessary because it allows us to compare the way a state is actually reached with the way we committed ourselves to reach it. We show that some situations that could formerly not be expressed easily in deontic logic can be described in a natural way using the extended logic described in this paper.},Author = {Frank Dignum and {\text{J.-J. Ch.}} Meyer and Roel J. Wieringa and R. Kuiper},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:08:04 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 14:08:39 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {80--97},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {A Modal Approach to Intentions, Commitments and Obligations: Intention plus Commitment yields Obligation},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{allen96from,Abstract = {The Hohfeldian fundamental legal conceptions that deal with solely deontic LEGAL RELATIONS, the duty/privilege and right/no-right pairs, require not only an adequate definition of agency for the person who is obligated or permitted to act, but also the same of patiency for the person to-or-for whom that action is directed. Person-i's DUTY to see-to-it-that that state-of-affairs-s is so for the benefit of person-j is defined here in terms of a deontic OBLIGATION operation and DONE-BY (D2) and DONE-FOR (D4) relations between a state of affairs and persons. This paper is a refinement of hte author's earlier efforts to modify, extend, and enrich Hohfeld's fundamental legal conceptions into a more general notion of LEGAL RELATIONS (defined concepts are expressed in capital letters.) In particular, the agency concept DONE-BY is being brought into closer conformity with Belnap's emerging stit logic, with the modifications of deontic logic accompanying such changes. The S4-D2 action modal logic considered here is intended to be part of the A-HOHFELD logic in which LEGAL RELATIONS are defined and from which a representation language called the A-HOHFELD language is derived. The A-HOHFELD language is being used as a representation language for constructing MINT (Multiple INTerpretation) interpretation-assistance system for helping lawyers to detect alternative structural interpretations of sets of legal rules.},Author = {Layman E. Allen},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-20 11:00:06 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:08:01 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {1--26},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {From the Fundamental Legal Conceptions of Hohfeld to Legal Relations: Refining the Enrichment of Solely Deontic Legal Relations.},Year = {1996}
}
@book{deon96,Date-Added = {2008-06-19 18:43:42 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-19 18:53:08 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{artosi96towards,Abstract = {In this paper we describe an algorithmic framework for a multi-modal logic arising from the combination of the system of modal (epistemic) logic devised by Meyer and van der Hoek for dealing with nonmonotonic reasoning with a deontic logic of the Jones and P\"orn-type. The idea behind this (somewhat eclectic) formal set-up is to have a modal framework expressive enough to model certain kinds of deontic defeasibility, in particular by taking into account preferences on norms. The appropriate inference mechanism is provided by a tableau-like modal theorem proving system which supports a proof method closely related to the semantics of modal operators. We argue that this system is particularly well-suited for mechanizing nonmonotonic forms of inference in a monotonic multi-modal setting.},Author = {Alberto Artosi and Guido Governatori and Giovanni Sartor},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 3rd International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1996), Sesimbra, Portugal, January 11-13, 1996},Date-Added = {2008-06-19 18:39:23 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-20 11:03:18 +0200},Editor = {Mark A. Brown and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Isbn = {3-540-76015-6},Keywords = {deon96},Pages = {27--46},Publisher = {Springer},Series = {Workshops in Computing},Title = {Towards a Computational Treatment of Deontic Defeasibility},Year = {1996}
}
@inproceedings{sergot98method,Abstract = {The Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions attempts to use a combination of deontc logic and a logic of action/agency to give a formal account of obligations, duties, rights, and other complex normative concepts. The paper presents a generalization and further development of the Kanger-Lindahl theory, together with methods for its automation and application to practical examples. Particular attention is paid to representations at varying levels of detail, in order that the analysis of examples can be constructed in steps by a process of progressive refinement. The resulting inference methods can be formulated as a simple graph-colouring algorithm, as implemented in the computer program Norman-G.},Author = {Marek Sergot},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 17:07:08 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 17:07:08 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {387--407},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {A Method for Automating the Analysis of Normative Positions},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{firozabadi98formal,Abstract = {The aim of this paper is to give formal definitions for fraud situations that can occur in an organized interaction between a number of agents. A distinction between a normative system and its control system is made for specification of these systems. It is argued that a fraud case is one which contains a violation occurring in the normative system and a lie about the fulfilment of that obligation towards the existing control system. The role of deontic logic is discussed for specification of a class of control systems called detective control systems. The fraud definitions given in this paper are given using modal operators in Deontic, Action and Epistemic logic.},Author = {Babak Sadighi Firozabadi and Yao-Hua Tan},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:58:01 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:58:01 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {371--385},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Formal Models of Fraud},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{ramos98deontic,Abstract = {There are already approaches that show how deontic logic can be used in a theory of diagnosis based on minimal sets. In those approaches deontic notions are represented by a propositional language enriched with violation constants. However, diagnoses based on minimal sets are insufficient to capture the specificities of process design diagnosis. In organizational process design it is important to have a preventive diagnosis that, not only detects violations (minimal diagnosis), but also detects cases of unfulfilled obligations. Deontic notions based on violation constants are not adequate if we consider more than minimal diagnosis, mainly because of conditional obligations. In this paper we present an extension of minimal diagnosis theory that addresses process design specificities, and a modal deontic logic that supports this extended theory.},Author = {Pedro Ramos and Jos{\'e} Luiz Fiadeiro},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:52:47 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:52:47 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {353--369},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {A Deontic Logic for Diagnosis of Organizational Process Design},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{mcnamara98andersonian,Abstract = {I recast the DWE-ish deontic framework as an Andersonian-Kangerian modal framework and explore its metatheory systematically and efficiently.},Author = {Paul McNamara},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:46:16 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:46:16 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {331--351},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Andersonian-Kangerian Dwe-ish Logics},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{torre98update,Abstract = {In this paper we propose the deontic logic DUS, that formalizes reasoning about prescriptive obligations in update semantics. In DUS the definition of logical validity of obligations is not based on truth values but on action dynamics. You know the meaning of a normative sentence if you know the change it brings about in the betterness relation of anyone who is subjected to the news conveyed by it.},Author = {Leendert W. N. van der Torre},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:41:35 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 17:11:55 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {409--426},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {An Update Semantics for Deontic Reasoning},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{krogh98protocol,Abstract = {This paper offers arguments in favour of employing normative notions and deontic logic when analysing cryptographic protocols. It also identifies a new class of protocol flaws called violation flaws.},Author = {Christen Krogh and Andrew J. I. Jones},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:32:35 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:32:35 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {291--308},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Protocol Breaches and Violation Flaws},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{krabbendam98contextual,Abstract = {There are many deontic logical systems in literature. Some deontc logics model universal obligations, others obligations in the current state. An example of the first is Anderson's reduction, an example of the second category is Standard Deontic Logic. A third category is more or less in between, and examples are dyadic deontic lgocis. Also, there is a distinction between ought-to-do and ought-to-be deontic logics. Some ought-to-be deontic logics are mentioned above, whereas an example of ought-to-do is Meyer's reduction. There is a similarity between the universal obligation's of Anderson's ought-to-be reduction and the current obligations in Meyer's ought-to-do reduction. These two deontic logics are the most outlying logics in a variety of deontic logics with obligations which are neither universal, nor local. In this paper the alethinc modality in Anderson's reduction is weakened to a restricted form of necessity and Meyer's reduction is strengthened, applying the same technique. This approach of restricted forms of necessity can be expressed by the so-called release logic. It is a modal logic which is particularly well-fitted for partial specifications, hence, contextual obligations. Finally, both ought-to-{be,do} reductions will be combined in one single contextual deontic logic.},Author = {Jeroen Krabbendam and {\text{J.-J. Ch.}} Meyer},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:29:23 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:29:23 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {271--290},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Contextual Deontc Logic},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{hansen98relations,Abstract = {The aim of this essay is to tie up some loose ends in deontic logic. Under consideration are two particularly strong deontic systems: {\AA}qvist's dyadic deontic logic G and van Eck's system of temporally relative deontic logic. From van Eck's system of quantificational deontic temporal logic QDTL a corresponding propositional deontic temporal system DTL is constructed to which Arrow's Axiom is added and the resulting system called DTL+. I prove that any ``temporally indexed" theorem of G becomes a valid sentence of DTL+ and that any sentence in the language of G which when temporally indexed is valid in DTL+ is valid in G also. Metaphorically speaking, standard dyadic deontic logic as represented by G is the logic of a snap shot taken of any temporal deontic model at any point of time.},Author = {J\"org Hansen},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:20:03 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:20:03 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {253--270},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {On Relations Netween {\AA}qvist's Deontic Logic System G and Van Eck's Deontic Temporal Logic},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{hage98semantics,Abstract = {Naturalistic theories of deontic reasoning assume that it is possible to give the truth conditions of deontic sentences by means of solely non-deontic sentences. In this paper it is argued that the fashionable model-theoretic semantics for deontic logic is biased toward the widely shared presupposition that such naturalistic theories are false. A brief argument is given for a naturalistic theory of practical reasoning and it is shown how such a theory can be given a model-theoretic semantics. The argument hinges amongst others on a strict distinction between deontic rules and deontic facts and on the treatment of rules as logical individuals.},Author = {Jaap Hage},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:09:36 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:09:36 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {235--252},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Semantics for a Fragment of Moderately Naturalistic Deontic Logic},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{goble98deontic,Abstract = {This paper investigates how deontic logic may be combined with relevant logic. Approached in one way deontic principles join easily with relevance. Somewhat surprisingly, approached in another way, which seems a generalization of the first, they combine far less well.},Author = {Lou Goble},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 16:03:12 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:03:12 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {217--234},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Deontic Logic with Relevance},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{gabbay98dealing,Abstract = {In this paper, following Scott's advice, we argue that normative reasoning can be represented in a multi-setting framework; in particular in a multi-modal one, where modalities are indexed. Indexed modalities can model several aspects involved in normative reasoning. Systems are combined using Gabbay's fibring methodology which provides complete semantics that can be used to model a labelled tableau like proofs system.},Author = {Dov M. Gabbay and Guido Governatori},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:59:14 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:59:14 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {197--216},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Dealing with Label Dependent Deontic Modalities},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{dignum98investigation,Abstract = {In this paper we consider the notion of ought-to-do obligation in the context of several concepts of time. Starting from the relatively easy case of discrete time and a lockstep interpretation of actions, we experiment with several plausible definitions and propose a generalized notion of obligation for dense time. A crucial ingredient of the definition proposed is to consider a branching-time temporal operator in order to capture the obligation to a choice of actions adequately.},Author = {Frank Dignum and R. Kuiper and {\text{J.-J. Ch}} Meyer},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:55:19 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:55:19 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {179--195},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {An Investigation into Deontics of Durative Actions},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{cholvy98reasoning,Abstract = {It often happens that several different regulations apply to a given organization. And sometimes, these regulations are conflicting, that is, for instance, one regulation says that it is forbidden to do some action while another says it is permitted to do the same action. In this paper, we present a logic, called FUSION, to reason when several regulations are merged together. Our approach is to solve the conflicts by giving an order of priority between the regulations to be merged. We present the axiomatics and semantics of FUSION and prove some ``good" properties enforced by this logic.},Author = {Laurence Cholvy and Frederic Cuppens},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:46:11 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:46:11 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {161--178},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Reasoning about Norms Provided by Conflicting Regulations},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{brown98agents,Abstract = {This paper investigates a species of multi-agent diachronic deontic logic, based on models with branched time, in which branches, rather than moments are taken as basics. With such models, supplemented by a set of agents, a choice function to model their agency, and an obligation function to induce normative features, we can develop a rich language for describing and analyzing the interrelationships over time between commitments, actions, and abilities.},Author = {Mark A. Brown},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:41:24 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:41:24 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {143--160},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Agents with Changing and Conflicting Commitments: A Preliminary Study},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{lindahl98intermediate,Abstract = {In legal theory, it is a well-known idea that an intermediary concept like ``ownership" ``couples" a set $C_1, \ldots, C_n$ of legal consequences ti a set $F_1, \ldots, F_p$ of legal grounds. In our paper we attempt to make the idea of a coupling between grounds and consequences more precise by formulating it as a relation holding between two condition lattices. When stating this, however, it is important to distinguish couplings from mere ``connections". ---We begin the main exposition by presenting a legal mini-system, where a structure of descriptive conditions is coupled to a structure of normative conditions and where an intermediate concept is used for coupling the two structures. Next, we present a different example where the set of grounds is ``open" and we have to deal with a family of coupled structures satisfying a legal requirement. In the following part, we introduce a more rigorous framework for conditions and lattices and develop the formal theory. In particular, we define and explain the notions of connection and coupling, as well as the relations ``narrower than" and ``wider than" between couplings. Finally, in our conclusion, we suggest that the idea of intermediate concepts can be further developed for elucidating important concepts outside the legal area.},Author = {Lars Lindahl and Jan Odelstad},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:35:42 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 16:33:42 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {309--329},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Intermediate Concepts as Couplings of Conceptual Structures},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{lazzer98some,Abstract = {In this paper we review some aspects of the theory of defeasible conditionals that the late Carlos Alchourr\'on developed in the last years of his life. These include both philosophical intuitions and formal features of his theory. In particular, we discuss the concept of a contributory condition used by Alchourr\'on, his formalization of the notion of prima facie duty and the connection between his theory of defeasible conditionals and the AGM logic of theory change.},Author = {Lazzer Sandra and Oller Carlos and Palau Gladys and Becher Veronica and Ferme Eduardo and Rodriguez Ricardo},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:31:45 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:31:45 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {113--125},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Some observations on \text{Carlos Alchourr\'o n}'s Theory of Defeasible Conditionals},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{bartha98moral,Abstract = {The paper argues that we can 'tame' standard deontic logic by narrowing our focus to a particular agent deliberating ar a particular moment. A semantics for obligations and conditional obligations is developed using the Horty/Belnap dstit-semantics together with a preference ordering on the possibilities available to an agent. It is argued that this semantics correctly models reasoning about contrary-to-duty obligations, inclusing a strengthened version of the Chisholm paradox. Defeasible obligations are interpreted as inducing a particular preference ordering, which in turn determines definite obligations for an agent.},Author = {Paul Bartha},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:26:47 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:26:47 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {93--111},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Moral Preference, contrary-to-duty obligation and defeasible oughts},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{artosi98tableau,Abstract = {In this paper we present a theorem proving methodology for a restricted but significant fragment of the conditional language made up of (boolean combinations of) conditional statements with unnested antecedents. The method is based on the possible world semantics for conditional logics. The label formalism introduced in [AG94,ABGR96] to account for the semantics of normal modal logics is easily adapted to the semantics of conditional logics by simply indexing labels with formulas. The inference rules are provided by the propositional system KE+ ---a tableau-like analytic proof system devised to be used both as a refutation and a direct method proof--- enlarged with suitable elimination rules for the conditional connective. The theorem proving methodology we are going to present can be viewed as a first step towards developing appropriate algorithmic framework for several conditional logics for (defeasible) conditional obligation.},Author = {Alberto Artosi and Guido Governatori},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-26 15:22:45 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:22:45 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {75--91},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {A Tableau Methodology for Deontic Conditional Logics},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{makinson98on,Abstract = {The usual presentations of deontic logic, whether axiomatic or semantic, treat norms as if they could bear truth-values. A fundamental problem of deontic logic, we believe, is to reconstruct it in accord with the philosophical position that norms direct rather than describe, and are neither true nor false. Alchourr\'o n and Bulygin 1981 have indeed made such a construction, refining an earlier one of Stenius 1963, based on the distinction between a norm and a proposition about norms. However it has the limitation that it does not deal with conditional norms. These are covered by an extension of Alchourr\'o n 1993, but with certain shortcomings. Our purpose is to extend the basic 1981 construction in another manner which, we suggest, provides a more satisfactory and sensitive analysis of conditional norms within the same philosophical perspective.The approach takes seriously the warning: no logic of norms without attention to a system of which they form a part. It is based on the notion of the iterative development of output of an explicitly presented normative code, under a given condition. It is neither axiomatic in style nor formulated in terms of a semantics of  ``possible worlds". It develops output by repeated detachment rather than by consequence (so as not to lose the directionality of conditional norms), and it distinguishes between gross and net output (so as to deal adequately with conditions that are ``contrary-to-duty"). The investigation also provides new perspectives on some well known problems. In particular, it throws light on the way in which explicit obligations may have a part in generating permissions, and how explicit permissions may limit obligations. It also helps pin down a distinction between ``substantive" and ``technical" defeasibility of conditional norms.},Author = {Davide Makinson},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-25 18:06:51 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-25 18:06:51 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {3--42},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {On a Fundamental Problem of Deontic Logic},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{bell98dynamic,Abstract = {In this paper we introduce and formalize dynamic obligation hierarchies. We begin with a formal definition of obligations. In particular, we require that an agent's obligations are coherent; that is, that each obligation is jointly realisable with all of the obligations which are at least as important. This an agent's obligations form a hierarchy, and new obligations are defined with reference to it. We then show how preferential entailment can be used to formalize the revision of obligations and obligation hierarchies.},Author = {John Bell and Zhisheng Huang},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-25 18:05:10 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-26 15:35:21 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {127--141},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Dynamic Obligation Hierarchies},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{wright98deontic,Abstract = {No abstract given.},Author = {Georg H. von Wright},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-25 18:03:35 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-25 18:06:00 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {61--72},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Deontic Logic---as I see it},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{pizzi98iterated,Abstract = {No abstract given.},Author = {Claudio Pizzi},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-25 17:56:03 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-25 18:04:49 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {45--60},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Iterated Conditionals and Causal Imputation},Year = {1998}
}
@proceedings{deon98,Date-Added = {2008-06-25 17:44:48 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-25 17:55:49 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Organization = {University of Bologna},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{nute98norms,Abstract = {There are at least three good reasons to try to develop a defeasible version of normative reasoning. First, many norms are prima facie, binding only if they are not overriden by more compelling norms. Second, norms in one system may take precedence over norms in another system, as the principles lex superior and lex posterior require. Third, otherwise attractive principles of normative reasoning often combine to give counterintuitive results unless some method can be developed for repressing some of these principles in troublesome cases.},Author = {Donald Nute},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 4th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 1998), Bologna, Italy, January 8-10, 1998},Date-Added = {2008-06-25 17:40:34 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-25 17:58:49 +0200},Editor = {Paul McNamara and Henri Prakken},Keywords = {deon98},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {University of Bologna},Pages = {43},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Norms, Priorities, and Defeasibility: Abstract},Year = {1998}
}
@inproceedings{demolombe00application,Abstract = {In the field of information systems the notion of constraint may be used for quite different kinds of statements. Here we apply deontic logic and doxastic logic to propose formal definitions for the different interpretations of these statements.In our analysis we distinguish practical constraints and deontic constraints; the latter are either obligations about the world or obligations about the correctness of the representation of the world. We also show that to check whether obligations are violated, assumptions (that are also called ``constraints") are accepted. These assumptions may also be about the world or about the correctness of its representation. Then, we define what an information system has to know to detect the different kinds of obligation violations. This formal analysis is followed by a pragmatic analysis where we describe the origin of these statements, and in which kinds of processes they are involved. },Author = {Robert Demolombe and Andrew J. I. Jones and Jos{\'e} Carmo},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:21:45 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:21:45 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {147--166},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {An Application of Deontic Logic to the Analysis of Information System Constraints},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{tan00formal,Abstract = {In this paper we describe how an agent's trust in transactions is a combination of an agent's trust in the other party and the trust in the control mechanisms for the succesful performance of the transaction. This distinction is in particular relevant for the international business-to-business electronic commerce, where trading partners often do not know each other before the trading takes place. We argue also that the agent's understanding of a control mechanism is essential for the agent's trust in that control mechanism. We give a formal analysis of the understanding that is required for control mechanisms to work, and for determining the subjective level of trust in control mechanisms in electronic commerce.},Author = {Yao-Hua Tan and Walter Thoen},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 17:26:01 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 17:26:01 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {331--350},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Formal Aspects of a Generic Model of Trust for Electronic Commerce},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{sergot00on,Abstract = {The theory of normative positions attempts to apply a combination of deontic logic and a logic of action/agency to the formalization of the `Hohfeldian concepts' (duty, right, power, privilege, etc.) and other complex normative relations between agents. This paper is concerned with the practical applicability of the theory to such tasks as formalizing the content of an existing set of regulations, designing a new set of regulations, or refining aspects of a computer system specification, with particular attention to the usefulness of the action component as a representational device. Points are made by reference to a simple example concerning rules in a car park. The second part of the paper covers three simple extensions: the representation of `permitted to bring about', a treatment of interpersonal control relations, and the ability to distinguish between being permitted to bring about a new state of affairs and being permitted to sustain a state of affairs that already exists.},Author = {Marek Sergot and Fiona Richards},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 17:21:39 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 17:21:39 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {311--330},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {On the Representation of Action and Agency in the Theory of Normative Positions},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{parent00defeasible,Abstract = {My aim in this paper is to highlight what I view as questionable in Makinson's method of analyzing defeasible conditional obligation sentences, as sketched in "Five faces of minimality". I will focus the discussion on the following two points: the role played by time and the logical properties satsified by the conditional obligation operator.},Author = {Xavier Parent},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 17:15:45 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 17:15:45 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {301--309},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Defeasible Conditional Obligation: Some Remarks},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{mcnamara00toward,Abstract = {There is little work of a systematic nature in ethical theory or deontic logic on aretaic notions such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, despite their centrality as concepts of common sense morality. Without more work, there is little hope of filling the even larger gap of attempting to develop frameworks integrating such aretaic concepts with deontic concepts of common sense morality, such as what is obligatory, permissible and impermissible. It is also clear in the case of aretaic concepts that agency is central to such appraisal, so some agential notions must be integrated with aretaic concepts as well. The current paper takes the first step in a larger project aimed at the closure of these gaps. Here I sketch a simple framework for the aretaic appraisal of an agent's performance, layered on top of a simple framework for agency, ability, and inevitability, combining elements of work by Brown, Elgesem, Carmo and Santos. In Part II, drawing on work by Chisholm and Sosa on intrinsic preferability, I sketch and explore a framework for defining aretaic superiority, praiseworthiness, blameworthiness, neutrality, and indifference, etc., retaining proper links to agency.},Author = {Paul McNamara},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 16:26:16 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 16:26:16 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {281--300},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Toward an Integrated Agential and Aretaic Framework},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{makinson00consistency,Abstract = {In a range of contexts, one comes across processes resembling inference, but where input propositions are not in general included among outputs, and the operation is not in any way reversible. Examples areise in contexts of conditional obligations, goals, ideals, preferences, actions, and beliefs. In a separate paper, we developed a general theory of such processes when they are applied without restriction. In this paper, we compare systematically several ways of restricting them by consistency constraints.},Author = {David Makinson and Leendert van der Torre},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 16:08:59 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 16:08:59 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {261--280},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Consistency Constraints for Input/Output Logic: A Comparative Review},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{makinson00input,Abstract = {In a range of contexts, one comes across processes resembling inference, but where input propositions are not in general included among outputs, and the operation is not in any way reversible. Examples areise in contexts of conditional obligations, goals, ideals, preferences, actions, and beliefs. Our purpose is to develop a general theory of propositional input/output operations. Particular attention is given to the special case where outputs may be recycled as inputs.},Author = {David Makinson and Leendert van der Torre},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 15:45:04 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 15:45:04 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {239--259},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Input/Output Logics},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{jennings00natural,Abstract = {The paper revisits a class of model structures introduced by the author in 1974, with particular attention to the system SCon, which axiomatizes the universal class. SCon, which independently deserves notics as an algebraically plausible weakest modal system, is self-dual; that is, box and diamond have the same logic. The paper explores the consequences of self-duality for the axiological interpretation of natural frames.},Author = {Jennings, R. E. },Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 15:42:08 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 15:42:08 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {225--238},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Natural Frames and Self-dual Logics},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{hansen00sets,Abstract = {We follow Makinson's (1999) suggestion to reconstruct deontic logic according to the view that norms are devoid of truth values. Restricting ourselves to unconditional imperatives, we philosophically motivate and defend a logical semantics of imperatives not shaken by J\o\hspace{-0.2mm}rgensen's dilemma, and then show that existing systems can be reconstructed accordingly. So it seems there is a reading according to which deontic logic is after all a logic about, if not of, norms.},Author = {J\"org Hansen},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 15:38:27 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 15:38:27 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {203--223},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Sets, Sentences, and Some Logics about Imperatives},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{hage00action,Abstract = {In this paper we argue that the distinction between action types and act tokens is relevant for a proper understanding of the distinction between prima facie obligations and all out obligations. After a discussion of the approach in which norms that deal with action types are analysed in terms of the deontic classification of individual acts, we explore the opposite approach. We take norms that deal with action types as primitive, and show how the evaluation of individual acts is influenced (but not determined) bu the deontic status of the several action types which these acts instantiate. This view is formalised, first in a simple version, which disregards exceptions to norms, and then in a more complex variant, which takes exception into account. Finally the distinction between action types and act tokens is used to characterise the distinction between weak and strong permissions.},Author = {Jaap Hage and Bob Brouwer},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 15:33:27 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 15:33:27 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {187--2001},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Action Types and Act Tokens in Deontic Logic of the Ought-to-do Type},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{goble00multiplex,Abstract = {This multiplex semantics incorporates multiple relations of deontic accessibility or, alternatively, multiple preference rankings, on alternative worlds to represent distinct normative standards. This provides a convenient framework for deontic logic that allows conflicts of obligation, due either to conflicts between normative standards or to incoherence within a single standard. With the multiplex structures, two general senses of 'ought' may be distinguished, an indefinite sense under which something is obligatory when it is enjoined by some normative standard and a core sense for when something is enjoined by all normative standards. Multiple normative standards may themselves be ranked by precedence; this leads to a concept of comparative obligation. This paper presents the foundations of this multiplex semantics and the propositional deontic logic they define.},Author = {Lou Goble},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-07-07 15:28:16 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 15:28:16 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {167--186},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Multiplex Semantics for Deontic Logic},Year = {2000}
}
@proceedings{deon00,Date-Added = {2008-07-07 14:14:42 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:23:08 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{cholvy00attempt,Abstract = {This paper presents some preliminary work which attempts to adapt, in the context of deontic reasoning, the CO logic defined by Boutilier for reasoning with conditional preferences. The first motivation for this work is that deontic logic can be given a semantics in terms of ordered worlds as in CO logic: the preference relation among worlds aims at ordering words from the most ideal ones to the least ideal ones. The second motivation is that Boutilier introduced a model of an agent's ability by distinguishing between controllable and, influenceable and uninfluenceable propositions. And we noticed that this partition can be related to the notions introduced by Carmo and Jones for reasoning with Contrary-to-Duties. This present work shows an extension of Boutilier's work in order to use CO logic for reasoning with Contrary-to-Duties. The results obtained with this extension do not coincide exactly with those obtained by Carmo and Jones: the full impact of these differences has not yet been studied.},Author = {Laurence Cholvy and Christophe Garion},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 20:24:54 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 20:24:54 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {125--145},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {An Attempt to Adapt a Logic of Conditional Preferences for Reasoning with Contrary-to-Duties},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{carmo00deontic,Abstract = {In this paper we address the problem of collective agency, and propose a deontic/action modal logic for that purpose. We argue that once we want to attribute obligations (permissions or other deontic notions) to a set of agents, we need to consider a new agent --an institutionalized agent, and specify how he interacts with the external world: how the obligations flow from the institutionalized agent to the real agents that support him, and how the actions of the latter count as actions of the former. But an agent may act in many qualities (roles), and it is essential to know in which quality an agent has acted, or intends to act, for three main reasons: to know the effects of the act, its deontic qualification, and authentication issues. Thus, we extend the ``sees to it" action operator with an explicit index that states the quality (role) in which the agent has acted. We also show how to associate obligations to roles, and illustrate how this can be used to express the desired flow of obligations.},Author = {Jos{\'e} Carmo and Olga Pacheco},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 20:13:51 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 20:13:51 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {93--124},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Deontic and Action Logics for Collective Agency and Roles},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{brown00conditional,Abstract = {This paper investigates the semantic treatment of conditional obligation, explicit permission (often called positive permission), and prohibition based on models with agents and branched time. In such models branches (rather than moments) are taken as basic, and the branching provides a way to represent the indeterminism which is normally presupposed by talk of free will, responsibility, action and ability. Careful treatment of the relation between ability and responsibility avoids many common problems with accounts of conditional obligation. Recognition of the generality often involved in conditional obligations makes possible a sensitive way of expressing some kinds of general prohibitions, which in turn makes it possible to account for the special role of explicit permission.},Author = {Mark A. Brown},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 20:07:24 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 20:07:24 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {63--91},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Conditional Obligation, Permission, Prohibition, and Positive Permission for Agents in Time},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{broersen00mu,Abstract = {This paper introduces deontic logic of regular actions as a fragment of the modal $\mu$-calculus. Semantic characterizations of deontic notions for regular actions are given in terms of conditions on $\mu$-calculus structures, and $\mu$-calculus formulas capturing this semantics are constructed.},Author = {Jan Broersen and Roel Wieringa and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 20:01:47 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 20:01:47 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {43--61},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {$\mu$-calculus-based Deontic Logic for Regular Actions},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{aqvist00three,Abstract = {We consider an infinite hierarchy of systems of Alethic Modal Logic with so called ``Levels of Perfection", and add to them suitable definitions of such interesting deontic categories as those of supererogation, offence, conditional obligation and conditional permission. We then state three problems concerning the proper characterization of the resulting logic(s) for our defined notions, and argue for a positive solution to two of these problems.},Author = {Lennart {\AA}qvist},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 19:58:42 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 19:58:42 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {15--41},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Three Characterizability Problems in Deontic Logic},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{prakken00modelling,Abstract = {Several philosophers and AI researchers have advocated procedure (in the legal sense) as a model of practical reasoning (e.g. Toulmin, Rescher, Loui, Gordon). The idea is that a practical argument is acceptable if it has been successfully defended in a fair and effective procedure for dispute. Yet most work on nonmonotonic logic defines defeasible consequence not in procedural terms but as a declarative relation between premises and conclusion of an argument. In this talk I shall investigate the role of procedure in defeasible legal reasoning. I shall take an idea of Layman Allen seriously that the `nonprovability' referred to in nonmonotonic logic is, when applied to legal reasoning, not logical but legal-procedural nonprovability. I shall present an argument game which leaves room for two legal-procedural phenomena, the introduction of new information and shifts of the burden of proof. I shall argue that these phenomena are essential to the defeasibility of legal reasoning but that they are not captured by current declarative accounts of defeasible reasoning. It remains to be seen to what extent this also holds for other forms of practical reasoning.},Author = {Henri Prakken},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 19:52:12 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 19:52:12 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {11},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Modelling Defeasibility in Law: Logic or Procedure?},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{odelstad00conceptual,Abstract = {The aim of our paper is to contribute to the formal study of concept formation in normative systems. The framework developed is based on the theory of Boolean algebra, and the basic kind of relations dealt with are called Boolean quasi-orderings. Our framework is abstract in the sense that the main results are not tied to a specific interpretation, although, primarily we have in mind an application where the structure is a normative system and where the Boolean quasi-ordering is a relation of implication between what we call ``conditions". The framework is flexible insofar as it can be used either for the joining of two conceptual substructures, called ``fragments", within a background structure, or for the generation of a common background structure when two or more particular structures are given. Attention is paid to how equivalent norms can be formulated by different conceptual structures. In particular, we show which structural changes result when norms involving so-called hypothetical normative consequents are reformulated as norms with pure normative consequents. },Author = {Jan Odelstad and Lars Lindahl},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 19:44:04 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-06-27 19:44:04 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {9},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Conceptual Structures in Normative Systems},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{castelfranchi00formalizing,Abstract = {In this talk I will start with the problem of Social Order and Social Control (in info-societies and MAS) by illustrating deliberated and spontaneous forms of Social Order and intended or unintended, centralized or decentralized forms of Social Control. I will discuss some approaches to social order in IT and some of its delusions. I will claim that it is possible and necessary to ``incorporate" social and normative knowledge and phenomena in intelligent technology, and that in order to effectively support human cooperation --which is strongly based on social, moral, and legal notions-- computers must be able to model and ``understand" at least partially what happens among the users. They should be able to manage and then partially ``understand", for example, permissions, obligations, power, roles, commitments, trust.I will consider here only one facet of the problem of normative social control: the spontaneous and decentralized normative creation, monitoring and intervention. I will not consider the more formal and institutional aspects of social order. In particular, I will discuss some cognitive aspects of the elaboration of spontaneous conventions, implicit commitments, tacit agreements. I will also illustrate our (Conte and Castelfranchi) view of the spontaneous and decentralized issuing and spreading of norms. I will illustrate how I see the transition from ``face to face" normative relationships to some stronger constraints of agents' action, and to institutions, authority and law, and how this can increase trust. I will do this by discussing the transition from two parties trust, rights, permission, social commitments, to three parties relationships, where some witness is introduced, or some norm and even some enforcing authority. Finally, in this perspective of formalizing the informal, the interpersonal non-official normative matter, I will consider (also in order to illustrate the danger of a computer-based formalization and enforcement of rules in organizations) the important phenomenon of functional (i.e., collaborative) systematic violation of rules and prescriptions in organization and cooperation; and the emergence --in some cases-- of a ``convention to violate".},Author = {Cristiano Castelfranchi},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 19:33:07 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 17:42:49 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Note = {Invited lecture},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {3--5},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Formalizing the Informal?},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{torre00causal,Abstract = {In this paper we introduce a descriptive temporal deontic logic based on causal theories. The underlying nonmonotonic temporal logic has two distinctive properties. First, it distinguishes between observations and interventions, which among others is used to distinguish between the existence and creation of deontic states such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions. Second, its explicit causal theories lead to a descriptive or modeling perspective, that not only enables a simple and intuitive formalization of the benchmark examples of nonmonotonic temporal reasoning, but that also makes the logic a good candidate for applications in computer science.},Author = {Leendert van der Torre},Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2000), Toulouse, France, January 20-22, 2000},Date-Added = {2008-06-27 19:25:36 +0200},Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 17:26:49 +0200},Editor = {Robert Demolombe and Risto Hilpinen},Keywords = {deon00},Organization = {ONERA},Pages = {351--367},Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},Title = {Causal Deontic Logic},Year = {2000}
}
@inproceedings{vranas02new,    Abstract = {I outline six components of a comprehensive proposal for overhauling the foundations of deontic logic. (1) Actions and prescriptions are temporally indexed; more preciselym they attach to nodes of a tree in a branching time structure. (2) Actions are (modeled as) sets of branches and can be coarse- or fine-grained depending on whether or not they have have proper subsets which are also actions. (3) Prescriptions have satisfaction and violation sets; these are sets of branches which may ---but need not--- be or include actions. (4) Prescriptive propositions, which state that an action is obligatory/permitted/forbidden according to a given prescription, are defined by relationg the action with the satisfaction and violation sets of the prescription. (5) Conditional prescriptions can ---but need not--- be derived from unconditional or even from other conditional ones. (6) Thick prescriptions, in contrast to thin ones, prescribe or proscribe actions with varying intensities, and can have embedded subprescriptions (some of which are negative, namely ``contrary-to-duty"). Most of the above components are inspired by the literature, but their combination is novel.},    Author = {Peter B. M. Vranas},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-08 14:19:43 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-08 14:19:43 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {299--322},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {New Foundations for Deontic Logic: A Preliminary Sketch},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{santos02modal,    Abstract = {This paper proposes a logic-oriented framework for organization specification, analysis and design. Within this framework organizations are seen as a society of agents with responsibilities and capabilities, and that interact with each other according to some form of ``institutionalized power relations". Organizations are analyzed according to the properties of their agents' interactions, characterized by means of modal action and deontic logics of the type developed in the Philosophy area. Although rather simple, the proposed framework supports some interesting aspects of the analyses of organizations, with potential applications in the scope of organizational design, e.g. analysis of task distribution and analysis of attribution of responsibilities. This later analysis is based on Reiter's diagnosis theory. These aspects of analyisis have been automated in a workbench capable of answering queries about what can and should be done, in a given organization, to achieve particular goals. The workbench uses a tableaux theorem proving method extended with additional rules to deal with the proposed classical action and deontic modalities.},    Author = {Filipe Santos},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-08 14:11:10 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-08 14:11:10 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {279--297},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {A Modal Logic Framework for Organization Analysis and Design},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{parikh02towards,    Abstract = {Is it possible to create a theory of how social procedures work with a view of understanding them and designing better ones? I want to start with an illustrative example of a common difficulty.},    Author = {Rohit Parikh},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-08 14:03:05 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-08 14:03:05 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {265--277},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Towards a Theory of Social Software},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{makinson02permission,    Abstract = {Input/Output logics are abstract structures designed to represent conditional obligations and goals. In this paper we use them to study conditional permission. This perspective provides a clear separation of the familiar notion of negative permission from the more elusive one of positive permission. Moreover, it helps reveal that there are at least two kinds of permission. Although indistinguishable in the unconditional case, they are quite different in conditional contexts, essentially because contraposition is not available. One of them, which we call forward positive permission, guides the citizen and law enforcement authorities in the assessment of specific actions, and it behaves like a weakened obligation. Another, which we call backward positive permission or prohibition immunity, guides the legislator. It describes the limis on what may subsequently be prohibited, and for certain codes behaves like a strenghtened negative permission. These operators are defined explicitly and their basic properties and interrelations investigated.},    Author = {David Makinson and Leendert van der Torre},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-08 13:51:38 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-08 13:51:38 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {233--264},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Permission from an Input/Output Perspective},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{mcnamara02preliminary,    Abstract = {At DEON'00, I employed a simple classical non-normal logic for agency integrated with a normal logic for predetermination, and then defined ``ability" in terms of elements of both. In the current paper, I explore various ways of integrating that framework with a framework for obligations. However, the agential obligation operator explored here is defined in terms of non-agential yet personal obligation operator and a non-deontic agency operator. This is contrary to the main current trend, which assumes statements of personal obligation always take agential complements. Instead, we take the basic form to be an agent's being obligated to be such that p. I sketch some logics for agential obligation based on personal obligations (and derivatively, agential obligations), and then in contexts that do allow for conflicts of both sorts.},    Author = {Paul McNamara},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-08 11:20:30 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-08 11:20:30 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {203--231},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {A Preliminary Exploration of Agential Obligation as Non-Agential Personal Obligation Plus Agency},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{lomuscio02violation,    Abstract = {The design of complex multi-agent systems is increasingly having to confront the possibility that agents may not behave as they are supposed to. In addition to analysing the properties that hold if protocols are followed correctly, it is also necessary to predict, test, and verify the properties that would hold if these protocols were to be violated. We illustrate how the formal machinery of deontic interpreted systems can be applied to the analysis of such problems by considering three variations of the bit transmission problem. The first, an example in which an agent may fail to do something it is supposed to do, shows how we deal with violations of protocols and specifications generally. The second, an example in which an agent may do somethiing it is not supposed to do, shows how it is possible to specify and analyze remedial or error-recovery procedures. The third combines both kinds of faults and introduces a new component to the system, a controller whose role is to enforce compliance with the protocol. In each case the formal analysis is used to test whether critical properties of the system are compromised, in this example, the reliable communication of information from one agent to the other.},    Author = {Alessio Lomuscio and Marek Sergot},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:54:50 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:54:50 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {181--202},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Violation, Error Recovery, and Enforcement in the Bit Transmission Problem},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{lindahl02normative,    Abstract = {The formal analysis of normative systems as initiated by Alchourron and Bulygin can be complemented by the analysis of normative positions as pursued by Kanger, Lindahl, Sergot and Jones. The paper is a step towards integrating te two approaches within an algebraic theory of so-called Boolean quasi-orderings (Bqo's). In the general Bqo theory presented, a number of theoretical tools are introduced and elucidated by theorems, in particular those of fragment, connection, coupling and pair coupling. Condition implication structures (cis's) are models of the Bqo theory used for the representation of normative systems. A system of normative positions is introduced as a special kind of cis. The final section is devoted to an example exhibiting a legal mini-system where a cis of normative positions is joined to a descriptive cis. },    Author = {Lars Lindahl and Jan Odelstad},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:46:18 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:46:18 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {149--180},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Normative Positions within an Algebraic Approach to Normative Systems},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{kimbrough02note,    Abstract = {No abstract given.},    Author = {Steven Orla Kimbrough},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:31:08 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:31:08 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {139--148},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {A Note on the Good Samaritan Paradox and the Disquotation Theory of Propositional Content},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{hansen02problems,    Abstract = {Deviating from standard possible-worlds semantics, authors belonging to what might be called the `imperative' tradition of deontic logic have proposed a semantics that directly represents norms (or imperatives). The paper examines possible definitions of deontic operators in such a semantics and some properties of the resulting logical systems.},    Author = {J\"org Hansen},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:29:08 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:29:08 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {117--138},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Problems and Results for Logics about Imperatives},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{governatori02gentzen,    Abstract = {In this paper we present a Gentzen system for reasoning with contrary-to-duty obligations. The intuition behind the system is that a contrary-to-duty is a special kind of normative exception. The logical machinery to formalize this idea is taken from substructural logics and it is based on the definition of a new non-classical connective capturing the notion of reparational obligation. Then the system is tested against well-known contrary-to-duty paradoxes.},    Author = {Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:26:32 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:26:32 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {97--116},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {A Gentzen System for Reasoning with Contrary-To-Duty Obligations. A preliminary Study},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{demolombe02from,    Abstract = {A solution to the frame problem in the context of belief change has been defined in the framework of Situation Calculus. In this paper we show how this solution can be adapted to obligation change. For that purpose ideality levels are assigned to situations in the context of belief change. However, it is shown that there are deep differences between the evolution of beliefs and the evolution of obligations. This is a preliminary study and we do not consider all the aspects of obligation change. In particular obligations about the evolution of the world are ignored.},    Author = {Robert Demolombe},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:21:54 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:21:54 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {73--95},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {From Belief Change to Obligation Change in the Situation Calculus. A Preliminary Study.},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{cholvy02collective,    Abstract = {A collective obligation is an obligation directed to a group of agents so that the group, as a whole, is obliged to achieve a given task. The problem investigated here is to study the impact of collective obligations to individual obligations, i.e. obligations directed to single agents of the group. The groups we consider do not have any particular hierarchical structure nor have an institutionalized representative agent. In this case, we claim that the derivation of individual obligations from collective obligations depends on several parameters among which the abiligy of the agents (i.e. what they can do) and their own personal commitments (i.e. what they are determined to do). As for checking if these obligations are fulfilled or not, we need to know what are the actual actions performed by the agents. This present paper addresses these questions in the rather general case when the collective obligations are conditional ones.},    Author = {Laurence Cholvy and Christophe Garion},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:16:39 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:16:39 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {55--72},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Collective Obligations, Commitments and Individual Obligations: A Preliminary Study},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{brown02rich,    Abstract = {This paper begins the development of new types of deontic operators, particulary ones whose semantic characterization is based on models with forward-branching time. In such models, supplemented by a choice function to model human agency, and an obligation function to introduce normative features, it is possible to develop a rich language with a variety of obligation operators, the causal consequences, and the logical consequences of actions. We approach these concepts making extensive use of the notion of a transition, as introduced in Xu [1997].},    Author = {Mark A. Brown},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:11:15 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:11:15 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {55--72},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Rich Deontic Logic: A Preliminary Study},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{broersen02new,    Abstract = {In dynamic deontic logics, ought-to-do deontic assertions are reduced to dynamic logic assertions about violating postconditions of actions. This paper redefines the notion of action negation for dynamic logics, and uses this notion in an alternative version of the deontic-dynamic reduction. The approach provides a uniform treatment to all three central normative concepts, i.e., permission, prohibition and obligation, as applied to compound action exhibiting all relevant action cmbinators, i.e. choice, sequence, concurrency, converse, and iteration. It is shown that the resulting series of deontc dynamic logic is intuitive: they obey a set of minimal logic requirements for ought-to-do dynamic deontic logics, and they perform well on standard reasoning examples concerning choice and contrary to duty norms. Furthermore, the deontic-dynamic reduction avoids some strong interdefinabilities between deontc operators as assumed by Meyer [17].},    Author = {Jan Broersen},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 19:05:43 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 19:05:43 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {21--37},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {A New Action Base for Dynamic Deontic Logics},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{abrahms02life,    Abstract = {In this paper we argue for a treatment of obligations, permissions, and prohibitions that differs from the standard treatment of these notions in deontic logic. Firstly, in Section 2, we propose that instantiated norms be treated as individual, identified entities -- that is, variables that can be quantified over -- rather than simply as logical operators as in Standard Deontic Logic. This allows us to refer to specific instances of obligations, permissions, and prohibitions. We explain why we believe that norms take, as their arguments, sets of occurrences rather than simply propositions as in the standard treatment. Further, we argue that specific, identified norms themselves are brought about by occurrences. In Section 3, we provide an account of the life-cycle of norms: we explain how individual identified norm-instances are generated from general norms through functions of occurrences, and how each such instance's life may end with its fulfilment, violation, or nullification. In addition, we suggest (Section 4) that norms are situated: that they must be tagged with the context in which they were written or spoken. This is necessary for conflict specification, detection, and resolution purposes (Section 5). Finally, in Section 6, we tag our conclusions with a time, so that, without contradiction, we may non-monotonically conclude different results as cases and norms vary over time.},    Author = {Alan Abrahms and Jean Bacon},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:56:18 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:56:18 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {3--18},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {The Life and Times of Identified, Situated, and Conflicting Norms},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{meyden02what,    Abstract = {There are interesting times for those interested in applications of deontic logic, or at least they ought to be. Current research and development in computer science is addressing a host of new types of applications and technologies that have deontic concepts at their core, including digital rights management, web services, personal data services and public key authorization infrastructures. The distributed nature of these applications inherently constrains what implementations are able to achieve. Tha talk will discuss the new breed of applications and the impact that distributed computing has at the level of deontic specification. In particular, it will be argued that in addition to the deontic modalities, reasoning about knowledge and probability is critical to an understanding of the precise sense in which real distributed systems implement deontic specifications.},    Author = {Rob {\text{van der}} Meyden},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:46:56 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:46:56 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Note = {Invited lecture},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {1},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {What You Should Probably Know about Deontic Specifications in a Distributed Setting},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{thomason02new,    Abstract = {Despite interest in the topic since it was introduced by Aristotle, the practical side of reasoning has remained broadly speculative and informal, at least as a branch of logic. I will argue that ideas from logical AI provide ways of fundamentally improving this situation. I will illustrate the point with examples from my own work, which draws on nonmonotonic logic, planning formalisms, and qualitative theories of preferences.},    Author = {Richmond Thomason},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:39:57 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:39:57 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Note = {Invited lecture},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {1},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {New Opportunities in the Formalization of Practical Reasoning},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{prakken02models,    Abstract = {I will describe a formal framework for models of dispute resolution, and apply it to an example procedure, the Dutch civil summons procedure. A key aim of the framework is to relate (static) logical accounts of defeasible reasoning with (dynamic) models of dispute resolution. The framework is flexible in several respects. It allows for different underlying logics, alternative sets of speech acts and more or less strict rules for when they are allowed. Its formal nature supports the study of formal properties of disputational protocols, especially on how they respect the underlying logic. The example application improves earlier models of legal procedures in several respects. Most importantly, it models a realistic role of the judge instead of hardwiring it in the logic of protocols.},    Author = {Henry Prakken},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:36:35 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:36:35 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Note = {Invited lecture},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {1},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Models of Dispute Resolution: A Formal Framework and an Application},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{hansson02semantics,    Abstract = {Most systems of deontic logic, including standard deontic logic, give rise to blatantly implausible theorems. Attempts to accomodate these ``paradoxes" have taken up much of the efforts spent in this field of logic. According to the speaker, in order to avoid the paradoxical results it is necessary to give up the traditional possible world semantics for deontic logic. Instead, we should investigate new semantic constructions on which weaker and more plausible deontic logics can be based. A construction is proposed that is based on the simple idea that whatever is better than something permitted is also permitted. Some results obtained along these lines are presented, including axiomatic characterizations.},    Author = {Sven Ove Hansson},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:30:57 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:30:57 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Note = {Invited lecture},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {1},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Semantics for More Plausible Deontic Logic},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{aqvist02conditionality,    Abstract = {No abstract given.},    Author = {Lennart Aqvist},    Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:30:06 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-08 14:20:59 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Pages = {299--322},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Conditionality and Branching Time in Deontic Logic: Further Remarks on the Alchourron and Bulygin (1983) Example},    Year = {2002}
}
@proceedings{deon02,    Date-Added = {2008-07-07 18:23:24 +0200},    Date-Modified = {2008-07-07 18:30:50 +0200},    Editor = {John Horty and Andrew J. I. Jones},    Keywords = {deon02},    Organization = {Imperial College London},    Publisher = {Informal Proceedings},    Title = {Proceedings of the 6th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2002), London, England, May 22-24, 2002},    Year = {2002}
}
@inproceedings{torre04specifying, Abstract = {In this paper we investigate the specification and verification of information systems with an organizational structure. Such systems are modelled as a normative multiagent system. To this end we use $KBDIO_{CTL}$, an extension of $BDI_{CTL}$ in which obligations and permissions are represented by directed modal operators. We illustrate how the logic can be used by introducing and discussing various properties of normative systems and individual agents which can be represented in the logic. In particular we discuss the enforcement of norms.}, Author = {Leendert van der Torre and Joris Hulstijn and Mehdi Dastani and Jan Broersen}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {243--257}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Specifying Multiagent Organizations}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{raimondi04automatic, Abstract = {We present an algorithm and its implementation for the verification of correct behaviour and epistemic states in multiagent systems. The verification is performed via model checking techniques based on OBDD's. We test our implementation by means of a communication example: the bit transmission problem with faults.}, Author = {Franco Raimondi and Alessio Lomuscio}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {228--242}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Automatic Verification of Deontic Properties of Multi-agent Systems}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{pacheco04delegation, Abstract = {In an organizational context the norms that apply to an agent depend on the roles he holds in the organization. The deontic characterization of structural roles is defined when the organization is created. But an organization is not a static entity. Among the dynamic phenomena that occur in an organization there are interactions between agents consisting in a transference of obligations or permissions from an agent to another. These kind of interactions are called delegation. In this paper we analyze different ways in which delegation occurs in an organizational context. We argue that the concept of agent in a role is relevant to understand delegation. A deontic and action modal logic is used to specify this concept.}, Author = {Olga Pacheco and Filipe Santos}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {209--227}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Delegation in a Role-Based Organization}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{kouznetsov04quasi, Abstract = {We use non-Kripkean quasi-matrix semantics for the formalization of the systems $S_{3d}$, $S_{3dp}$ and $S_{3dq}$  of deontic logic. The system $S_{3d}$ is weaker than the standard logic . The semantics for $S_{3dp}$  represents combination of quasi-matrix semantics and the semantics of truth value gluts, which allows $S_{3dp}$ to avoid deontic explosion $O A \wedge O \neg B \supset O B$. The system $S_{3dq}$ rejects both deontic explosion and the formula $O A \wedge O \neg A \supset O A \wedge O \neg A$, thus it allows to consider deontic dilemmas without classical contradictions.
The systems $S_{5d}$, $S_{5dp}$  and $S_{5dq}$  in which the two types of deontic operators are used, namely, strong and weak obligation (permission), can be built as an extension of the correspondent systems $S_{3d}$, $S_{3dp}$ and $S_{3dq}$ .}, Author = {Andrei Kouznetsov}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {191--208}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Quasi-matrix Deontic Logic}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{goble04proposal, Abstract = {In this paper I propose a simple modification of standard deontic logic that will enable the system to accommodate deontic dilemmas without inconsistency and without deontic explosion, while at the same time preserving the range of genuinely valid inferences. The proposal applies both to monadic deontic logic and to a dyadic logic of conditional obligation. In the Appendix these systems are proved to be sound and complete with respect to an appropriate semantics and also to be decidable.}, Author = {Lou Goble}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {74--113}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {A Proposal for Dealing with Deontic Dilemmas}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{jamroga04obligations, Abstract = {In this paper, we combine deontic logic with Alternating-time Temporal Logic (ATL) into a framework that makes it possible to model and reason about obligations and abilities of agents. The way both frameworks are combined is technically straightforward: we add deontic accessibility relations to ATL models (concurrent game structures), and deontic operators to the language of ATL (an additional operator  is proposed for unconditionally permitted properties, similar to the all I know operator from epistemic logic). Our presentation is rather informal: we focus on examples of how obligations (interpreted as requirements) can be confronted with ways of satisfying them by actors of the game. Though some formal results are presented, the paper should not be regarded as a definite statement on how logics of obligation and strategic ability must be combined; instead, it is intended for stimulating discussion about such kinds of reasoning, and the models that can underpin it.}, Author = {Wojciech Jamroga and Wiebe van der Hoek and Michael Wooldridge}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {165--181}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {On Obligations and Abilities}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{hansen04conflicting, Abstract = {Often a set of imperatives or norms seems satisfiable from the outset, but conflicts arise when ways to fulfill all are ruled out by unfortunate circumstances. Semantic methods to handle normative conflicts were devised by B. van Fraassen and J. F. Horty, but these are not sensitive to circumstances. The present paper extends these resolution mechanisms to circumstantial inputs, defines according dyadic deontic operators, and provides a sound and (weakly) complete axiomatic system for such a deontic semantics.}, Author = {J\"org Hansen}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {146--164}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Conflicting Imperatives and Dyadic Deontic Logic}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{jones04normative, Abstract = {This paper is a preliminary investigation into the application of the formal-logical theory of normative positions to the characterisation of normative-informational positions, pertaining to rules that are meant to regulate the supply of information.}, Author = {Andrew J. I. Jones}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {182--191}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {On Normative-Informational Positions}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{governatori04defeasible, Abstract = {We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combination of agency, intention and obligation. We argue about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent and reason with them in the setting of defeasible logic.}, Author = {Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {114--128}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Defeasible Logic: Agency, Intention and Obligation}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{wyner04maintaining, Abstract = {We consider the logical representation of obligations on stative expressions such as The yard must be clean in the context of legal contract formation, execution, and monitoring (cf. Wyner ([28])). In a contract, the expression may understood as an obligation to maintain a property. We use a Deontic Action Logic to represent obligations over the course of time (Khosla and Maibaum ([13]) and Meyer ([17])). Our analysis is in contrast to dAltan, Meyer, and Wieringa ([6]), who reduce deontic operators to an Alethic Logic plus a violation proposition (Anderson and Moore ([1]), which has no temporal component. In addition, they use a Deontic Action Logic to represent obligations on actions. We claim the Alethic component of the logic is redundant for the purposes of representing obligations on stative expressions in a contract. In the course of the analysis, we introduce polynormativity, which contrasts with the binormativity of standard DAL or alethic logic plus a violation proposition. We discuss the advantages of polynormativity in reasoning from violations and fulfillments.}, Author = {Adam Zachary Wyner}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {258--274}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Maintaining Obligations on Stative Expressions in a Deontic Action Logic}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{demolombe04obligation, Abstract = {Obligation change raises the frame problem which is to characterise what obligations remain unchanged after an action has been performed. Many general solutions have been proposed but even if they are attractive from a thoretical point of view they have practical drawbacks. In this paper simple solutions are proposed thanks to the restriction to obligations that take the form of modal literals. These solutions are presented in the framework of dependence logic and of situation calculus, and it is shown that they are based on the same intuitive idea. This idea is to express that we have a complete representation of actions and circumstances that can change an obligation.}, Author = {Robert Demolombe and Andreas Herzig}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004},  Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {57--73}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Obligation Change in Dependence Logic and Situation Calculus}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{boella04delta, Abstract = {In this paper we consider the relation between desires and obligations in normative multiagent systems. We introduce a model of their relation based on what we call the social delegation cycle, which explains the creation of norms from agent desires in three steps. First individual agent desires generate group goals, then a group goal is individualized in a social norm, and finally the norm is accepted by the agents when it leads to the fulfilment of the desires the cycle started with. We formalize the social delegation cycle by formalizing goal generation as a merging process of the individual agent desires, we formalize norm creation as a planning process for both the obligation and the associated sanctions or rewards, and we formalize the acceptance relation as both a belief of agents that the fulfilment of the norm leads to achievement of their desires, and the belief that other agents will act according to the norm.}, Author = {Guido Boella and Leendert W. N. van der Torre}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004},  Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {29--42}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Delta: The Social Delegation Cycle}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{broersen04designing, Abstract = {This paper studies the logic of a dyadic modal operator for being obliged to meet a condition $\rho$  before a condition $\delta$ becomes true. Starting from basic intuitions we arrive at a simple semantics for deadline obligations in terms of branching time models. We show that this notion of deadline obligation can be characterized in the branching time logic CTL. The defined operator obeys intuitive logic properties, like monotony w.r.t. $\rho$  and anti-monotony w.r.t. $\delta$, and avoids some counter-intuitive properties like agglomeration w.r.t    $\rho$ and weak agglomeration w.r.t. $\delta$. However, obligations of this type are implied by the actual achievement of $\rho$ before the deadline. We argue that this problem is caused by the fact that we model the obligation only from the point of view of its violation conditions. We show that the property might be eliminated by considering success conditions also.}, Author = {Jan Broersen and Frank Dignum and Virginia Dignum and\text{J.-J. Ch} Meyer}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {43--56}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Designing a Deontic Logic of Deadlines}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{aqvist04combinations, Abstract = {We consider three infinite hierarchies of what I call two-dimensional temporal logics with explicit realization operators, viz. (i) one without historical or deontic modalities, (ii) one with historical but without deontic modalities, and (iii) one with historical and with dyadic deontic modalities for conditional obligation and permission. Sound and complete axiomatizations are obtained for all three hierarchies relative to a simplified version of the finite co-ordinate system semantics given for so-called T x W logic of historical necessity in \AAqvist (1999).}, Author = {Lennart {\AA}qvist}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004},  Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {3--28}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Combinations of Tense and Deontic Modality}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{wooldridge04social, Abstract = {Since it was first proposed by Moses, Shoham, and Tennenholtz, the social laws paradigm has proved to be one of the most compelling approaches to the offline coordination of multiagent systems. In this paper, we make three key contributions to the theory and practice of social laws in multiagent systems. First, we show that the Alternating-time Temporal Logic of Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman provides an elegant and powerful framework within which to express and understand social laws for multiagent systems. Second, we show that the effectiveness, feasibility, and synthesis problems for social laws may naturally be framed as atl model checking problems, and that as a consequence, existing atl model checkers may be applied to these problems. We illustrate the concepts and techniques developed by means of a running example.
(joint with with Wiebe van der Hoek and Mark Roberts)}, Author = {Wooldridge, M.}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004},  Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Note = {Abstract of invited talk}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {2}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Social Laws in Alternating Time}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{brown04obligation, Abstract = {Many obligations can be seen as arising from contractual arrangements (or from situations resembling contractual arrangements) among agents. My obligation to repay you the $100 I borrowed is associated with a simple (quite possibly tacit and informal) contractual arrangement between us. My obligations as an employee of my university are associated with contractual arrangements with my university, which may be considered a collective agent. My university in turn has certain obligations to me. But some obligations change over time as a result of changing circumstances, and in at least some cases the changes that occur can be thought of as involving a renegotiation of a contract among the parties involved. When I pay back half the money I owe you, I have not fulfilled my original obligation; but neither does that original obligation to pay you $100 still stand. Instead, we may consider, we have renegotiated my contract with you so that my remaining obligation is to pay you $50 (or, depending on details of the negotiation, perhaps $50 plus interest or a late fee). Analogous, though usually more explicit, renegotiations of contracts are commonplace in the corporate world as well. As we examine this way of looking at normative situations, we find a number of complications which must be considered, many of which we are accustomed to set aside in simpler treatments of deontic logic. We must consider the relationships among distinct agents, not just consider the normative positions of one agent at a time. We need to make room for corporate agents, i.e. agents which are organizations or groups of other agents. We need to consider that a single agent may be involved in multiple contractual arrangements, and thus may have a number of different normative roles simultaneously. As a result, we must make room for conflicting obligations. And we must allow for various kinds of modifications of contractual arrangements over time, including negotiation and renegotiation. Moreover, ultimately we must consider ways in which complex organizations are related to their changing roster of participant agents, whose roles within the organization alter over time.
In this paper, I will discuss a number of the issues which arise in any attempt to formalize a contractual model of our changing normative situations.}, Author = {Brown, M.}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004},  Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Note = {Abstract of invited talk}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {1}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Obligation, Contracts, and Negotiation}, Year = {2004}
}
@inproceedings{grossi04collective, Abstract = {This work addresses the issue of obligations directed to groups of agents. Our main concern consists in providing a formal analysis of the structure connecting collective obligations to individual ones: which individual agent in a group should be held responsible if an obligation directed to the whole group is not fulfilled? To this aim, concepts from planning literature (like plan and task allocation) are first used in order to conceptualize collective agency, and then formalized by means of a dynamic deontic logic framework. Within this setting, a formal account of the notion of coordination, intended as management of interdependencies among agents activities, is also provided.}, Author = {Davide Grossi and Frank Dignum and Lamber Royakkers and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Pages = {129--145}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Collective Obligations and Agents: Who Gets the Blame?}, Year = {2004}
}
@book{deon04,  Editor = {A. Lomuscio and D. Nute}, Isbn = {978-3-540-22111-1}, Keywords = {deon04}, Number = {3065/2004}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Proceedings of the 7th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2004), Madeira, Portugal, May 26-28, 2004}, Url = {http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/wt0cgl8br7y1/}, Year = {2004}, Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/wt0cgl8br7y1/}
}
@inproceedings{wyner06sequences, Abstract = {In order to provide an implemented language of deontic concepts on complex actions for the purposes of social simulation, we consider the logical representation of obligations, sequences of actions, and the Contrary to Duty (CTD) Paradox. We show that approaches which follow Standard Deontic Logic (Carmo and Jones (2002)) or Dynamic Deontic Logic (Khosla and Maibaum (1987) and Meyer (1988)) encounter problems with obligations, sequences, and CTDs. In particular, it is crucial to differentiate sequences of obligations from obligations on sequences and to consider contract change over time. Contra Meyer (1988), we argue that the CTD problem cannot be reduced to a a sequence of obligations. Contra Carmo and Jones (2002), the analysis of CTDs needs explicit state change and does not need a concept of ideality. We discuss P{\"o}rn's Criterion, which states that it is critical to a comprehensive theory of deontic reasoning to take dynamic aspects into account (P{\"o}rn (1977:ix-x)); in our view, this ought to encompass Contract State Change. In a theory of deontic specifications on actions, we show that articulated, compositional, and productive markers for violation and fulfillment are key to address the problems identified. The theorical arguments inform the Abstract Contract Calculator, a prototype implementation in Haskell of a language for reasoning with and simulating the results of deontically specified actions (Wyner (2006a) and Wyner (2006b)). With the language, one can represent and study the outcomes of multi-agent artificial normative systems as agents execute actions over time.}, Author = {Adam Zachary Wyner}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006},  Pages = {255--271}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Sequences, Obligations, and the Contrary-to-Duty Paradox}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{sergot06deontic, Abstract = {The action language  C+ of Giunchiglia, Lee, Lifschitz, McCain, and Turner is a formalism for specifying and reasoning about the effects of actions and the persistence (`inertia') of facts over time. An `action description' in  C+ defines a labelled transition system of a certain kind.  (formerly known as   ) is an extended form of   designed for representing normative and institutional aspects of (human or computer) societies. The deontic component of  nC+ provides a means of specifying the permitted (acceptable, legal) states of a transition system and its permitted (acceptable, legal) transitions. We present this component of  nC+ , motivating its details with reference to some small illustrative examples.}, Author = {Marek Sergot and Robert Craven}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006},  Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006},  Pages = {222--237}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {The Deontic Component of Action Language nC+ }, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{lomuscio06complete, Abstract = {We solve the problem left open in [5] by providing a complete axiomatisation of deontic interpreted systems on a language that includes full CTL as well as the Ki, Oi and Ki^j  modalities. Additionally we show that the logic employed enjoys the finite model property, hence decidability is guaranteed. To achieve these results we follow and extend the technique used by Halpern and Emerson in [2].}, Author = {Alessio Lomuscio and Bo{\.z}ena Wo{\'z}na}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006},  Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {238--254}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {A Complete and Decidable Axiomatisation for Deontic Interpreted Systems}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{muller06question, Abstract = {We aim at an adequate formal description of the dynamics of commitments and trust by transferring insights about actual human practices to a formal setting. Our framework is based on Belnap's theory of agents and choices in branching time (stit theory) and his analysis of commitments in terms of strategies. The main points are that (i) commitments come in various degrees of stringency, (ii) we can define a stringency ordering on an agent's possible strategies, and that (iii) trustworthiness can be spelled out in terms of strategies: An agent is living up to a given commitment, and thus, is trustworthy with respect to that commitment, if her strategy is at least as stringent as required. Overall trustworthiness of an agent can be defined by averaging over such single case assessments.}, Author = {Thomas M\"uller}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {210--221}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {A Question of Trust: Assessing the Fulfillment of Commitments in Terms of Strategies}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{lindahl06intermediate, Abstract = {In legal theory, a well-known idea is that an intermediate concept like ``ownership'' joins a set of legal consequences to a set of legal grounds. In our paper, we attempt to make the idea of a joining between grounds and consequences more precise by using an algebraic representation of normative systems earlier developed by the authors. In the first main part, the idea of intermediate concepts is presented and earlier discussions of the subjects are outlined. Subsequently, in the second main part, we introduce a more rigorous framework and develop the formal theory. In the third part, the formal framework is applied to examples and some remarks on a methodology of intermediate concepts are given.}, Author = {Lars Lindahl and Jan Odelstad}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {187--200}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Intermediate Concepts in Normative Systems}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{kooi06conflicting, Abstract = {Extending John Horty's multi-agent deontic logic to moral reasoning with subjective utilities, we provide a language and semantics to study moral reasoning with sentences like `Group E of agents ought see to it that phi in the interest of group F'. We illustrate our deontic logic with a new formal analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma, thereby showing that games can be studied fruitfully with our deontic logic. Finally, we prove a characterization theorem on conflicting obligations.}, Author = {Barteld Kooi and Allard Tamminga}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {175--186}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Conflicting Obligations in Multi-agent Deontic Logic}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{kaci06permissions, Abstract = {In this paper we are interested in non-monotonic extensions of Bengt Hansson's standard dyadic deontic logic 3, known as DSDL3. We study specificity principles for DSDL3 with both controllable and uncontrollable propositions. We introduce an algorithm for minimal specificity which not only covers obligations but also permissions, and we discuss the distinction between weak and strong permissions. Moreover, we introduce ways to combine algorithms for minimal and maximal specificity for DSDL3 with controllable and uncontrollable propositions, based on `optimistic' and `pessimistic' reasoning respectively.}, Author = {Souhila Kaci and Leendert van der Torre}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {161--174}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Permissions and Uncontrollable Propositions in DSDL3: Non-monotonicity and Algorithms}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{jones06normative, Abstract = {The paper outlines an approach to the formal representation of signalling conventions, emphasising the prominent role played therein by a particular type of normative modality. It is then argued that, in terms of inferencing related to this modality, a solution can be given to the task J. L. Austin set but failed to resolve: finding a criterion for distinguishing between what Austin called constatives and performatives. The remainder of the paper indicates the importance of the normative modality in understanding a closely related issue: reasoning about trust in communication scenarios; this, in turn, facilitates a clear formal articulation of the role of a Trusted Third Party in trade communication.}, Author = {Andrew J. I. Jones and Steven O. Kimbrough}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {149--160}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {On the Normative Aspect of Signalling Conventions}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{lokhorst06propositional, Abstract = {Several systems of monadic deontic logic are defined in terms of systems of alethic modal logic with a propositional constant. When the universal propositional quantifier is added to these systems, the propositional constant becomes definable in terms of the deontic operator. As a result, the meaning of this constant becomes clearer and it becomes easy to axiomatize the deontic fragments of the alethic modal systems.}, Author = {Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {201--209}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Propositional Quantifiers in Deontic Logic}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{hughes06dont, Abstract = {This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer's Propositional Deontic Logic (PDeL), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: ``Never do that'', or ``Do this someday''. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend PDeL so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these two notions. As a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation.}, Author = {Jesse Hughes and Lamber Royakkers}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {131--148}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Don't Ever Do That! Long-Term Duties in PDeL}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{brunel06state, Abstract = {This paper studies a logic that combines deontic and temporal aspects. We first present a state/event temporal formalism and define a deontic extension of it. Then, we study the interaction between the temporal dimension and the deontic dimension. We present some  logical properties, concerning formulas where deontic and temporal operators are nested, and discuss their intuitive meaning. We focus more particularly on the properties of obligation with deadline and define a specific operator to express this notion.}, Author = {Julien Brunel and Jean-Paul Bodeveix and Mamoun Filali}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {85--100}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {A State/Event Temporal Deontic Logic}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{demolombe06speech, Abstract = {A general logical framework is presented to represent speech acts that have institutional effects. It is based on the concepts of the Speech Act Theory and takes the form of the FIPA Agent Communication Language.The most important feature is that the illocutionary force of all of these speech acts is declarative. The formal language that is proposed to represent the propositional content has a large expressive power and therefore allows to represent a large variety of speech acts such as: to empower, to appoint, to order, to declare,...etc. The same formal language is also used to express the feasibility preconditions, the illocutionary effects and the perlocutionary effects.}, Author = {Robert Demolombe and Vincent Louis}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {101--114}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Speech Acts with Institutional Effects in Agent Societies}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{broersen06strategic, Abstract = {In this paper we extend earlier work on deontic deadlines in CTL to the framework of alternating time temporal logic (ATL). The resulting setting enables us to model several concepts discussed in the deontic logic literature. Among the issues discussed are: conditionality, ought implies can, deliberateness, settledness, achievement obligations versus maintenance obligations and deontic detachment. We motivate our framework by arguing for the importance of temporal order obligations, from the standpoint of agent theory as studied in computer science. In particular we will argue that in general achievement obligations cannot do without a deadline condition saying the achievement has to take place before it. Then we define our logic as a reduction to ATL. We demonstrate the applicability of the logic by discussing a possible solution to Chisholm's paradox. The solution differs considerably from other known temporal approaches to the paradox.}, Author = {Jan Broersen}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {53--68}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Strategic Deontic Temporal Logic as a Reduction to ATL, with an Application to Chisholm's Scenario}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{boella06delegation, Abstract = {In this paper we reconsider the definition of counts-as relations in normative multiagent systems: counts-as relations do not always provide directly an abstract interpretation of brute facts in terms of institutional facts. We argue that in many cases the inference of institutional facts from brute facts is the result of actions of agents acting on behalf of the normative systems and who are in charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts. We call this relation delegation of power: it is composed of a counts-as relation specifying that the effect of an action of an agent is an institutional fact and by a goal of the normative system that the fact is considered as an institutional fact. This relation is more complex than institutional empowerment, where an action of an agent counts-as an action of the normative  system but no goal is involved, and than delegation of goals, where a goal is delegated to an agent without giving it any power. With two case studies we show the importance of the delegation of power. Finally, we show how the new definition can be related with existing ones by using different levels of abstraction.}, Author = {Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {36--52}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Delegation of Power in Normative Multiagent Systems}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{boella06logical, Abstract = {Logical architectures combine several logics into a more complex logical system. In this paper we study a logical architecture using input/output operations corresponding to the functionality of logical components. We illustrate how the architectural approach can be used to develop a logic of a normative system based on logics of counts-as conditionals, institutional constraints, obligations and permissions. In this example we adapt for counts-as conditionals and institutional constraints a proposal of Jones and Sergot, and for obligations and permissions we adapt the input/output logic framework of Makinson and van der Torre. We use our architecture to study logical relations among counts-as conditionals, institutional constraints, obligations and permissions. We show that in our logical architecture the combined system of counts-as conditionals and insti- tutional constraints reduces to the logic of institutional constraints, which again reduces to an expression in the underlying base logic. Counts-as conditionals and institutional constraints are defined as a pre-processing step for the regulative norms. Permissions are defined as exceptions to obligations and their interaction is characterized. }, Author = {Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {24--35}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {A Logical Architecture of a Normative System}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{atkinson06addressing, Abstract = {In this paper, following the work of Hare, we consider moral reasoning not as the application of moral norms and principles, but as reasoning about what ought to be done in a particular situation, with moral norms perhaps emerging from this reasoning. We model this situated reasoning drawing on our previous work on argumentation schemes, here set in the context of Action-Based Alternating Transition Systems. We distinguish what prudentially ought to be done from what morally ought to be done, consider what legislation might be appropriate and characterise the differences between morally correct, morally praiseworthy and morally excusable actions.}, Author = {Katie Atkinson and Trevor Bench-Capon}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {8--23}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Addressing Moral Problems Through Practical Reasoning}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{grossi06counts-as, Abstract = {By making use of modal logic techniques, the paper disentangles two semantically different readings of statements of the type X counts as Y in context C (the classificatory and the constitutive readings) showing that, in fact, "counts-as is said in many ways".}, Author = {Grossi, D. and Meyer, {\text{J.-J.Ch}} and Dignum, F.}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {115--130}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Counts-as: Classification or Constitution? {An} Answer Using Modal Logic}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{dignum06norms, Abstract = {No abstract given.}, Author = {Frank Dignum}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Note = {Abstract of invited talk}, Number = {4048/2006}, Owner = {davide}, Pages = {2--5}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Norms and Electronic Institutions}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{carmo06roles, Abstract = {An organization may be the subject of obligations and be responsible for not fulfilling its obligations. And in order for an organization to fulfill its obligations, it must act. But an organization cannot act directly, so someone must act on its behalf (usually some member of the organization), and this must be known by the ``external world'' (by the agents that interact with the organization). In order to account for this, the organization is usually structured in terms of what we may call posts, or roles within the organization, and the statute of the organization distributes the duties of the organization among the different posts, specifying the norms that apply to those that occupy such positions (that hold such roles), and describing who has the power to act in the name of the organization. But this description is abstract, in the sense that it does not say which particular person can act in the name of the organization; it attributes such power to the holders of some roles. Depending on the type of actions, the power to act in the name of an organization may be distributed through different posts, and the holders of such posts may (or may not) have the permission or the power to delegate such power. On the other hand, those that can act in the name of an organization can establish new obligations for the organization through their acts, for instance by establishing contracts with other agents (persons, organizations, etc.). And in this way we have a dynamic of obligations, where the obligations flow from the organization to the holders of some roles, and these, through their acts, create new obligations in the organization. On the other hand, a person (or, more generally, an agent) can be the holder of different roles within the same organization or in different organizations (being the subject of potentially conflicting obligations), and can act by playing different roles. And in order to know the effects of his acts we must know in which role they were played. Thus, it is fundamental to know which acts count as acts in a particular role. If we want a logical formalism to abstractly specify and reason about all these issues, we need to consider and combine deontic, action and counts-as operators. Particularly critical is to decide which kind of action logic we consider. For some aspects, like that of describing how the obligations flow from the organization to the holders of some posts and how some of the acts of the latter count as acts of the organization, it seems it is better to consider a ``static'' approach based on the ``brings it about'' action operators. On the other hand, if we want to be able to describe the dynamics of the obligations deriving, for instance, from the contracts that are made in the name of the organization, it seems that a dynamic logic is necessary, or at least very useful. However, the combination of the two kinds of logic of actions has proven to be not an easy task. This paper addresses these issues. }, Author = {Jos\'e Carmo}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Note = {Abstract of invited talk}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {1}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Roles, Counts-as and Deontic and Action Logics}, Year = {2006}
}
@inproceedings{brown06acting, Abstract = {Supplementing an account of actions offered by Horty and Belnap [8] makes it more suitable for use in deontic logic. I introduce a new tense operator, for a while in the immediate future, provide for action terms as well as action formulas, and introduce an intention function into our models. With these changes, we are able to (a) explore means/ends relations involving actions, (b) make room for one agent to enable an- other to act, and (c) provide a means for distinguishing intended from unintended consequences. In combination, these improvements make it possible to consider collaborative action aimed at a goal, within a setting open to detailed normative scrutiny of ends, means, actions and intentions.}, Author = {Mark A. Brown}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {69--84}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Acting with an End in Sight}, Year = {2006}
}
@book{deon06, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Isbn = {978-3-540-35842-8}, Keywords = {deon06}, Number = {4048/2006}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Url = {http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/n222r67q4454/?p=e44f5efbf8a04d3d80e6669d16cb2bc0&pi=0}, Year = {2006}, Bdsk-Url-1 = {http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/wt0cgl8br7y1/}
}
@inproceedings{petta06emotion, Abstract = {Research in logic-based multi-agent modelling has been pushing steadily the boundaries of the domain models adopted, while associated enquiries on the relations between constituent entities contribute in turn to an improved understanding of the underlying domain as well as pave the way for moving beyond static scenarios of analysis (see e.g., Munroe et al. 2003, Boella and van der Torre 2004, Dastani and van der Torre 2005, as well as theoretical work on dynamic semantics in logics). The present talk results from a thread of activities including an ongoing investigation into the relation between the Emotional and computational models of situated normative systems (Staller and Petta 2001, Petta 2003) and work towards the realisation of dynamical representations in multi-agent systems (e.g, Jung and Petta 2005). In it, we will draw a picture of today's status in emotion theorising from the perspective of the ongoing dialogue between computational and psychological research. We will develop a view of the domain of human emotions as informed in particular by cognitive appraisal theories and situated cognition research that illustrates the role of emotions within the coordination of action and (different kinds of ) cognition in social scenarios and tries to clarify the nature of processes and concepts involved. }, Author = {Paolo Petta}, Booktitle = {Proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2006), Utrecht, The Netherlands, July 12-14, 2006}, Editor = {Lou Goble and {\text{J.-J.Ch}}. Meyer}, Keywords = {deon06}, Note = {Abstract of invited talk}, Number = {4048/2006}, Pages = {6--7}, Publisher = {Springer}, Series = {LNCS}, Title = {Emotion Models for Situated Normative Systems?}, Year = {2006}
}



@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Belnap08,
  author    = {Nuel Belnap},
  title     = {Norms in Branching Space-Times},
  abstract = {The idea of norms presupposes agency, and agency presupposes an indeterministic causal order (so that “ought” does not imply “is”). So much can be modeled in “branching time with agents and choices” (BTAC). The seriously ontological independence of agentive choices, however, requires, as a necessary condition, a causal order permitting space-like separation of those choices in a sense definable in “branching space-times with agents and choices” (BSTAC).Let us idealize an agent, when restricted to a single space-time, as a kind of spatio-temporal “worm” in the familiar way, representing the life of the agent in that space-time. Then a representation of “the agent,” since it must include representation of seriously objective choices, must look like a tree with two kinds of branching. In both kinds of branching, there is a single past-pointing worm-like representation of the past-life of the agent up to the branching, and an entire assemblage of distinct worm-like representations of the possible future-life of the agent subsequent to the branching, one for each history in which the life of the agent continues. The first kind of branching occurs at choice-points for the agent. According to BSTAC, such branching will involve a last point of agent’s-choice-not-yet-made (say, a last point of deliberation), but no first point of agent’s-choice-has-beenmade in any possible future-life of the agent. In the second kind of branching, the agent is passive, having two or more possible future-lives due to space-like-related choices by other agents, or by metaphorical “choices” by some space-like-related element of Nature. In this case, BSTAC says that there will be no last point of the past-life of the agent, but instead a first point for each of the agent’s possible future-lives.}, 
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {1-2}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/GovernatoriR08,
  author    = {Guido Governatori and
               Antonino Rotolo},
  title     = {Changing Legal Systems: Abrogation and Annulment Part I:
               Revision of Defeasible Theories},
  abstract = {In this paper we investigate how to model legal abrogation and annulment in Defeasible Logic. We examine some options that embed in this setting, and similar rule-based systems, ideas from belief and base revision. In both cases, our conclusion is negative, which suggests to adopt a different logical model. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {3-18}
}


@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Brown08,
  author    = {Mark A. Brown},
  title     = {Acting, Events and Actions},
  abstract     = {A logic of action is essential for many treatments of normative concerns, but most treatments either ignore the role of agents, as in PDL, or omit all possibility of naming actions, as in various versions of stit theory. Moreover, most treatments of either type do not attempt to provide an account of what actions are, in a way that would distinguish actions from other processes or events. In this paper, I explore an account of actions as a species of events, with events interpreted against a background of the logic of branching time. This opens a new approach to exploring the relations between logics of personal action (e.g. Belnap’s and Horty’s stit theories) and impersonal logics of actions such as PDL, and offers some prospect of a deontic logic which integrates tunsollen (ought to do) into a system of seinsollen (ought to be).
},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {19-33}
}



@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/CastroM08,
  author    = {Pablo F. Castro and
               T. S. E. Maibaum},
  title     = {A Tableaux System for Deontic Action Logic},
  abstract = {In [1] and [2] we have introduced a novel deontic action logic for reasoning about fault-tolerance. In this paper we present a tableaux method for this logic; this proof system is sound and complete, and because the logic has the usual boolean operators on actions, it also allows us to deal successfully with action complement and parallel execution of actions. Finally, we describe an example of application of this proof system which shows how the tableaux system can be used to obtain (counter-) models of specifications. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {34-48}
}


@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Anderson08,
  author    = {Ross J. Anderson},
  title     = {Information Security Economics - and Beyond},
  abstract = {The economics of information security has recently become a thriving and fastmoving discipline. As distributed systems are assembled from machines belonging to principals with divergent interests, incentives are becoming as important to dependability as technical design. The new field provides valuable insights not just into security topics such as privacy, bugs, spam, and phishing, but into more general areas such as system dependability (the design of peer-to-peer systems and the optimal balance of effort by programmers and testers), and policy (particularly digital rights management). This research program has been starting to spill over into more general security questions (such as law-enforcement strategy), and into the interface between security and the social sciences. Most recently it has started to interact with psychology, both through the psychologyand- economics tradition and in response to phishing. The promise of this research program is a novel framework for analyzing information security problems - one that is both principled and effective. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {49}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Cuppens-BoulahiaC08,
  author    = {Nora Cuppens-Boulahia and
               Fr{\'e}d{\'e}ric Cuppens},
  title     = {Specifying Intrusion Detection and Reaction Policies: An
               Application of Deontic Logic},
  abstract = {The security policy of an information system may include a wide range of different requirements. The literature has primarily focused on access and information flow control requirements and more recently on authentication and usage control requirements. Specifying administration and delegation policies is also an important issue, especially in the context of pervasive distributed systems. In this paper, we are investigating the new issue of modelling intrusion detection and reaction policies and study the appropriateness of using deontic logic for this purpose. We analyze how intrusion detection requirements may be specified to face known intrusions but also new intrusions. In the case of new intrusions, we suggest using the bring it about modality and specifying requirements as prohibitions to bring it about that some security objectives are violated. When some intrusions occur, the security policy to be complete should specify what happens in this case. This is what we call a reaction policy. The paper shows that this part of the policy corresponds to contrary to duty requirements and suggests an approach based on assigning priority to activation contexts of security requirements.
},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {65-80}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/HulstijnLT08,
  author    = {Joris Hulstijn and
               Jianwei Liu and
               Yao-Hua Tan},
  title     = {Delegation of Control in Administrative Procedures},
  abstract = {Norms are implemented by administrative procedures. This paper addresses the delegation of control in administrative procedures. Instead of having to check all details, a controlling actor can trust the data provided by other actors, provided they can demonstrate to be ‘in control’. In this paper we provide a conceptual analysis of situations in which control has been delegated. The approach is based on an analysis of the dependencies between activities performed by the actors involved and on evidence documents. To motivate and illustrate the approach, we discuss a case study about the redesign of EU customs procedures for collecting excise duties. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {81-95}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Abadi08,
  author    = {Mart\'{\i}n Abadi},
  title     = {Variations in Access Control Logic},
  abstract = {In this paper we investigate the design space of access control logics. Specifically, we consider several possible axioms for the common operator says. Some of the axioms come from modal logic and programming-language theory; others are suggested by ideas from security, such as delegation of authority and the Principle of Least Privilege. We compare these axioms and study their implications. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {96-109}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/DineshJLS08,
  author    = {Nikhil Dinesh and
               Aravind K. Joshi and
               Insup Lee and
               Oleg Sokolsky},
  title     = {Reasoning about Conditions and Exceptions to Laws in Regulatory
               Conformance Checking},
  abstract ={This paper considers the problem of checking whether an organization conforms to a body of regulation. Conformance is cast as a trace checking question – the regulation is represented in a logic that is evaluated against an abstract trace or run representing the operations of an organization. We focus on a problem in designing a logic to represent regulation.
A common phenomenon in regulatory texts is for sentences to refer to others for conditions or exceptions. We motivate the need for a formal representation of regulation to accomodate such references between statements. We then extend linear temporal logic to allow statements to refer to others. The semantics of the resulting logic is defined via a combination of techniques from Reiter’s default logic and Kripke’s theory of truth.
},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {110-124},
}


@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Hulstijn08,
  author    = {Joris Hulstijn},
  title     = {Need to Know: Questions and the Paradox of Epistemic Obligation},
  abstract = {Aqvist’s paradox of epistemic obligation can be solved, if we use knowledge-wh instead of knowledge-that in specifications of the ‘need to know’: the knowledge which an agent in a certain organisational role is required to have. Knowledge-wh is knowledge of an answer to a question, which depends on the context. We show how knowledge-wh can be formalised in a logic of questions, which is combined with standard deontic logic to represent epistemic obligations. We demonstrate that under the new interpretation, the paradox can no longer be derived. The resulting logic is useful for representation of access control policies. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {125-139}
}


@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Broersen08,
  author    = {Jan Broersen},
  title     = {A Logical Analysis of the Interaction between 'Obligation-to-do'
               and 'Knowingly Doing'},
  abstract = {Within a STIT framework, this paper presents a logical study of the interaction between ‘ought-to-do’, and an epistemic notion of ‘knowingly doing’. We start out with some motivating examples concerning the interaction between action, obligation and knowledge. Then we present a complete temporal STIT logic including operators for action, obligation and knowledge. We use the logic to analyze the examples and discuss open problems.},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {140-154}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Gabbay08,
  author    = {Dov M. Gabbay},
  title     = {Reactive Kripke Models and Contrary to Duty Obligations},
  abstract = {This is an intuitive description of our approach to modelling contrary to duty obligations. We shall describe our ideas through the analysis of typical problematic examples taken from Carmo and Jones [6], L. van der Torre [14] and Prakken and Sergot [5]. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {155-173}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Stolpe08,
  author    = {Audun Stolpe},
  title     = {Normative Consequence: The Problem of Keeping It Whilst
               Giving It up},
  abstract = {The problem of deriving implicit norms from explicitly given ones is at the heart of normative reasoning. In abstracto the problem is that of formalizing a plausible consequence relation taking norms to norms. I argue that any such relation should allow norms to be chained, even when the consequent of one is strictly stronger than the antecedent of another—i. e. even if logical inference is required to complete the chain. However, since it is commonly agreed that the set of items classically entailed by an obligatory proposition are not in general obligatory, we are left with the following problem: How do reserve the right to reason classically for the purpose of chaining, whilst not committing to the view that all items entailed by a norm are obligatory in the same sense. I shall argue that the problem can be given a natural solution with reference to different uses of a norm in a normative system. },
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {174-188}
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Parent08,
  author    = {Xavier Parent},
  title     = {On the Strong Completeness of {\AA}qvist's Dyadic Deontic
               Logic G},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  abstract = {Aqvist’s dyadic deontic logic G, which aims at providing an axiomatic characterization of Hansson’s seminal system DSDL3 for conditional obligation, is shown to be strongly complete with respect to its intended modelling. },
  pages     = {189-202}
}


@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/LindahlO08,
  author    = {Lars Lindahl and
               Jan Odelstad},
  title     = {Strata of Intervenient Concepts in Normative Systems},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {203-217},
  abstract = {Writing a contract of a specific content is a ground for purchase, purchase is a ground for ownership, ownership is a ground for power to dispose. Also power to dispose is a consequence of ownership, ownership is a consequence of purchase. etc. The paper presents a continuation of the authors’ previous algebraic representation on ground - consequence chains in normative systems.The paper analyzes different kinds of “implicative closeness” between grounds and consequences in chains of legal concepts, in particular combinations of “weakest ground”, “strongest consequence” and “minimal joining”. The idea of a concept’s being intermediate between concepts of two different sorts is captured by the technical notion of “intervenient”, defined in terms of weakest ground and strongest consequence. A legal example concerning grounds and consequences of “ownership” and “trust” is used to illustrate the application of the formal theory. }
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/BroersenMMT08,
  author    = {Jan Broersen and
               Rosja Mastop and
               John-Jules Ch. Meyer and
               Paolo Turrini},
  title     = {A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {218-232},
   abstract = {The paper discusses the interaction properties between preference and choice of coalitions in a strategic interaction. A language is presented to talk about the conflict between coalitionally optimal and socially optimal choices. Norms are seen as social constructions that enable to enforce socially desirable outcomes. }
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/McNamara08,
  author    = {Paul McNamara},
  title     = {Praise, Blame, Obligation, and Beyond: Toward a Framework
               for Classical Supererogation and Kin},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {233-247},
  abstract = {Continuing prior work ([1, 2]), I integrate a simple system for personal obligation with a system for aretaic (agent-evaluative) appraisal. I then explore various relationships between definable aretaic statuses such as praiseworthiness and blameworthiness and deontic statuses such as obligatoriness and impermissibility. I focus on partitions of the normative statuses generated (cf. "normative positions" but without explicit representation of agency). In addition to representing and exploring traditional questions in ethical theory about the connection between blame, praise, permissibility and obligation, this allows me to carefully represent schemes for supererogation and kin. These controversial concepts have provided challenges to both ethical theory and deontic logic, and are among deontic logic’s test cases. }
}

@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/DellundeG08,
  author    = {Pilar Dellunde and
               Lluis Godo},
  title     = {Introducing Grades in Deontic Logics},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {248-262},
  abstract        = {In this paper we define a framework to introduce gradedness in Deontic logics through the use of fuzzy modalities. By way of example, we instantiate the framework to Standard Deontic logic (SDL) formulas. Given a deontic formula Φ ∈ SDL, our language contains formulas of the form rN or rP , where r ∈ [0, 1], expressing that the preference or probability degree respectively of a norm Φ is at least r. We present sound and complete axiomatisations for these logics.}
}

inproceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/Grossi08,
  author    = {Davide Grossi},
  title     = {Pushing Anderson's Envelope: The Modal Logic of Ascription},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  year      = {2008},
  pages     = {263-277},
  abstract        = {The paper proposes a formal analysis of the ascriptive view of norms as resulting from pulling together Anderson’s reductionist approach, the analysis of counts-as, and a novel modal approach to the formal representation of languages in logic. This unifying attempt results in the definition of a new form of reduction of deontic logic based on counts-as statements. Such result is discussed also in the light of Jørgensen’s dilemma. }
}

@proceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/2008,
  editor    = {Ron van der Meyden and
               Leendert van der Torre},
  title     = {Deontic Logic in Computer Science, 9th International Conference,
               DEON 2008, Luxembourg, Luxembourg, July 15-18, 2008. Proceedings},
  booktitle = {DEON},
  publisher = {Springer},
  series    = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
  volume    = {5076},
  year      = {2008}
}
















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@inproceedings{[1],
	Abstract = {In this presentation, advances in modeling the mental dynamics of norms will be presented. In particular, the process from norm-adoption, possibly yielding new normative goals, to different forms of norm compliance will be focused upon, including norm internalization, which is at study in social-behavioral sciences and moral philosophy since long. Of late, the debate was revamped within the rationality approach pointing to the role of norm internalization as a less costly and more re- liable enforcement system than social control. So far, poor attention was paid to the mental underpinnings of internalization. In this presentation, a rich cognitive model of different types, degrees and factors of internalization is shown. The initial implementation of this model on EMIL-A, a normative agent architecture developed and applied to the.},
	Address = {Fiesole, Italy},
	Author = {Rosaria Conte and Giulia Andrighetto and Daniel Villatoro},
Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.1},
	Publisher = {Springer},
	Title = {From Norm Adoption to Norm Internalization},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[2],
	Abstract = {The starting point of the following remarks is that a fundamental aspect of judicial decisions (mainly in trial courts but often also in appellate courts) is the judgment about the facts in issue. In a sense, actually, judicial decisions derive from a sort of combination of legal and factual judgments. Lawyers - and logicians - usually deal with the legal dimension of these decisions and analyze the features and the structure of legal arguments and of legal justifications of a decision. However, the factual dimension of such decisions is no less important since -as it is commonly said- no decision is just if it is based upon the wrong facts.},
	Author = {Michele Taruffo},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.3-10},
	Title = {Towards a Logical Analysis of the Judgment on Facts},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[3],
	Abstract = {To decide which norms can be removed from a system, we need to know when a norm is redundant. After shifting the focus of attention in deontic logic from detachment of obligations and permissions to deontic redundancy, I discuss in this paper five benchmark examples of deontic redundancy in reasoning about permissions, intermediate concepts and constitutive norms, deontic dilemmas, temporal deontic reasoning and contrary-to-duty reasoning. Then I discuss those benchmark examples in four formal approaches to deontic reasoning: traditional model logic, dynamic approaches, violation oriented or diagnostic systems, and imperativist or norm based approaches.},
	Author = {Leendert van der Torre},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.11-32},
	Title = {Deontic Redundancy: A Fundamental Challenge for Deontic Logic},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[4],
	Abstract = {We propose a normal modal deontic logic based on a dyadic operator, similar in structure to the temporal ``until''. By bringing significant expressiveness to the logic, it allows both the definition of a monadic desirability operator similar to the SDL obligation, and the expression of the relative level of desirability of target formulae. The interpretation of this logic on a linear structure of worlds ordered by desirability makes its semantics more intuitive and concrete than the SDL deontic accessibility relation. We also show that the core modality of the logic permits to represent the Chisholm and Forrester paradoxes of deontic logic in a more precise way, which does not lead to inconsistencies.},
	Author = {Guillaume Piolle},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.33-49},
	Title = {A Dyadic Operator for the Gradation of Desirability},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[5],
	Abstract = {This paper looks at deontic logic as resulting from both a betterness ordering on states (i.e., a `deontic preference') and a priority ordering on properties (i.e., a `law' explicitly representing a standard of behavior). The correspondence between these two orderings offers a rich perspective from which to look at deontic scenarios and puzzles, and in particular at contrary-to-duties. The framework naturally lends itself to describing dynamics involving both orderings, thereby providing a new analysis of norm change as `betterness change'.},
	Author = {Johan van Benthem and Davide Grossi and Fenrong Liu},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.50-65},
	Title = {Deontics = Betterness + Priority},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[6],
	Abstract = {RoCTL* was proposed to model and specify the robustness of reactive systems. RoCTL* extended CTL* with the addition of Obligatory and Robustly operators, which quantify over failure-free paths and paths with one more failure respectively. This paper gives an axiomatisation for all the operators of RoCTL* with the exception of the Until operator; this fragment is able to express similar contrary-to-duty obligations to the full RoCTL* logic. We call this formal system NORA, and give a completeness proof. We also consider the fragments of the language containing only path quantifiers (but where variables are dependent on histories). We examine semantic properties and potential axiomatisations for these fragments.},
	Author = {Tim French and John Christopher McCabe-Dansted and Mark Reynolds},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.66-83},
	Title = {Axioms for Obligation and Robustness with Temporal Logic},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[7],
	Abstract = {The aim of this paper is to strengthen the point made by Horty about the relationship between reason holism and moral particularism. In the literature prima facie obligations have been considered as the only source of reason holism. I strengthen Horty's point in two ways. First, I show that contrary-to-duties provide another independent support for reason holism. Next I outline a formal theory that is able to capture these two sources of holism. While in simple settings the proposed account coincides with Horty's one, this is not true in more complicated or "realistic'' settings in which more than two norms collide. My chosen formalism is so-called input/output logic.},
	Author = {Xavier Parent},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.84-97},
	Title = {Moral Particularism and Deontic Logic},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[8],
	Abstract = {We show that a recently developed theory of positive permission based on the notion of derogation is hampered by a triviality result that indicates a problem with the underlying full-meet contraction operation. We suggest a solution that presupposes a particular normal form for codes of norms, adapted from the theory of relevance through propositional letter sharing. We then establish a correspondence between contractions on sets of norms in input/output logic (derogations), and AGM-style contractions on sets of formulae, and use it as a bridge to migrate results on propositional relevance from the latter to the former idiom. Changing the concept accordingly we show that positive permission now incorporates a relevance requirement that wards off triviality.},
	Author = {Audun Stolpe},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.98-115},
	Title = {Relevance, Derogation and Permission},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[9],
	Abstract = {In earlier works, we used Defeasible Logic to argue that techniques from belief and base revision encounter a number of difficulties in modelling legal dynamics. In particular, we showed that these techniques are not suitable when legal changes are retroactive. This suggested to adopt a different logical model able to express two main timelines, one internal to a given temporal version of the legal system, and another relative to how the legal system evolves over time. In this paper, we adjust our view and show that, under some restrictions, ideas from base revision, if applied to Defeasible Logic or to similar rule-based systems, can indeed capture some significant aspects of annulments, abrogations, and derogations.},
	Author = {Antonino Rotolo},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.116-131},
	Title = {Retroactive Legal Changes and Revision Theory in Defeasible Logic},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[10],
	Abstract = {The aim of the present paper is to provide a metalogical systematisation in the area of deontic action logic based on Boolean algebra. Differences among the systems in question lie in two aspects: the level of closedness of a deontic action logic and the possibility of performing no action at all. It is also shown that the existing definitions of obligation in those systems are not acceptable due to their unintuitive interpretation or paradoxical consequences. As a solution we propose an axiomatic characterisation of obligation with an adequate class of models.},
	Author = {Robert Trypuz and Piotr Kulicki},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.132-147},
	Title = {Towards Metalogical Systematisation of Deontic Action Logics Based on Boolean Algebra},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[11],
	Abstract = {In this paper, we present an adaptive logic for deontic conflicts, called P2.1r , that is based on Goble's logic SDLaPe --- a bimodal extension of Goble's logic P that invalidates aggregation for all prima facie obligations. The logic P2.1r has several advantages with respect to SDLaPe. For consistent sets of obligations it yields the same results as Standard Deontic Logic and for inconsistent sets of obligations, it validates aggregation ``as much as possible''. It thus leads to a richer consequence set than SDLaPe. The logic P2.1r avoids Goble's criticisms against other non-adjunctive systems of deontic logic. Moreover, it can handle all the `toy examples' from the literature as well as more complex ones.},
	Author = {Joke Meheus and Mathieu Beirlaen and Frederik Van De Putte},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.148-165},
	Title = {Avoiding Deontic Explosion by Contextually Restricting Aggregation},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[12],
	Abstract = {This paper examines the deontic logic of the Talmud. We shall find, by looking at examples, that at first approximation we need deontic logic with several connectives:
$O_{T} A$ (Talmudic obligation);
$F_{T} A$ (Talmudic prohibition);
$F_{D} A$ (Standard deontic prohibition);
$O_{D} A$ (Standard deontic obligation).
In classical logic one would have expected that deontic obligation $O_{D}$  is definable by
$O_{D} A = F_{D} \neg A$ 
and that $O_{T}$ and  $F_{T}$ are connected by $O_{T} A = F_{T} \neg A$. 
This is not the case in the Talmud for the $T$ (Talmudic) operators, though it does hold for the $D$ operators. We must change our underlying logic. We have to regard $\{O_{T},F_{T}\}$ and $\{O_{D},F_{D}\}$ as two sets of operators , where $O_{T}$ and $F_{T}$ are independent of one another and where we have some connections between the two sets.
We shall list the types of obligation patterns appearing in the Talmud and compare Talmudic Logic with modern deontic logic.},
	Author = {Michael Abraham and Dov M. Gabbay and Uri J. Schild},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.166-178},
	Title = {Obligations and Prohibitions in Talmudic Deontic Logic},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[13],
	Abstract = {This paper introduces Exclusion Logic - a simple modal logic without negation or disjunction. We show that this logic has an efficient decision procedure. We describe how Exclusion Logic can be used as a deontic logic. We compare this deontic logic with Standard Deontic Logic and with more syntactically restricted logics.},
	Author = {Richard Evans},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.179-195},
	Title = {Introducing Exclusion Logic as a Deontic Logic},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[14],
	Abstract = {Privacy policies are often defined in terms of permitted messages. Instead, in this paper we derive dynamically the permitted messages from static privacy policies defined in terms of permitted and obligatory knowledge. With this new approach, we do not have to specify the permissions and prohibitions of all message combinations explicitly. To specify and reason about such privacy policies, we extend a multi-modal logic introduced by Cuppens and Demolombe with update operators modeling the dynamics of both knowledge and privacy policies. We show also how to determine the obligatory messages, how to express epistemic norms, and how to check whether a situation is compliant with respect to a privacy policy. We axiomatize and prove the decidability of our logic.},
	Author = {Guillaume Aucher and Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.196-213},
	Title = {Privacy Policies with Modal Logic: The Dynamic Turn},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[15],
	Abstract = {Compliance is often achieved `by design' through a coherent system of controls consisting of information systems and procedures . This system-based control requires a new approach to auditing in which companies must demonstrate to the regulator that they are `in control'. They must determine the relevance of a regulation for their business, justify which set of control measures they have taken to comply with it, and demonstrate that the control measures are operationally effective. In this paper we show how value-based argumentation theory can be applied to the compliance domain. Corporate values motivate the selection of control measures (actions) which aim to fulfill control objectives, i.e. adopted norms (goals). In particular, we show how to formalize the dialogue in which companies justify their compliance decisions to regulators using value-based argumentation. The approach is illustrated by a case study of the safety and security measures adopted in the context of EU customs regulation.},
	Author = {Brigitte Burgemeestre and Joris Hulstijn and Yao-Hua Tan},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.214-228},
	Title = {Value-Based Argumentation for Justifying Compliance},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[16],
	Abstract = {We provide a logical analysis of private international law, the body of law establishing when courts of a country should decide a case (jurisdiction) and what legal system they should apply to this purpose (choice of law). A formal model of the resulting interaction among multiple legal systems is proposed based on modular argumentation. It is argued that this model may be useful for understanding this rather esoteric, but increasingly important, domain of the law. Moreover, it might be useful for modelling the way in which interactions between heterogeneous agents, belonging to different and differently regulated virtual societies, can be governed without recourse to a central regulatory agency.},
	Author = {Phan Minh Dung and Giovanni Sartor},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.229-246},
	Title = {A Logical Model of Private International Law},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[17],
	Abstract = {In 1926, Ernst Mally proposed the first system of deontic logic. His system turned out to be unacceptable. How can it be repaired? We discuss several proposals to reformulate it in terms of strict implication, relevant implication and strict relevant implication.},
	Author = {Gert-Jan C. Lokhorst},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.247-258},
	Title = {Where Did Mally Go Wrong?},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[18],
	Abstract = {The paper presents a logical framework for the integration of interactions between institutional agents, human agents and software agents. It is shown, through a case study, that the relationships between actions performed by these three kinds of agents are defined in terms of the Searle's ''counts as'' concept and their justifications are based on the roles hold by human agents or by a causal relationships between human agent actions and software agent actions.
The logical framework concentrates on the concepts of counts as, causality and role.},
	Author = {Robert Demolombe},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.259-273},
	Title = {Relationships between Actions Performed by Institutional Agents, Human Agents or Software Agents},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[19],
	Abstract = {Sometimes it is impossible to attribute responsibility to individuals when something goes wrong, or right, especially when many different agents are involved. Moral norms may dictate that certain events are not to happen, but responsibility can only be attributed to an agent if this agent was able to do the right thing, she knew what she ought to do, and she did not accidentally fail in completing her task. The fact that we cannot attribute responsibility for certain unfortunate events due to the absence of these conditions is called the problem of many hands. This contribution presents a logical analysis of the problem of many hands in the framework of XSTIT with intentions, as developed by Jan Broersen. The problem of many hands is analysed in terms of an inference from the existence of a norm and the fact that all agents are acting responsibly to the conclusion that the norm is obeyed. To make that inference valid, additional assumptions are necessary, to ensure that the fairness conditions are met. As the formal analysis shows, tasks can be distributed so as to minimize the gap in this inference, but it cannot be completely bridged: at some point we have to acknowledge that moral responsibility falls short of guaranteeing moral norm fulfilment.},
	Author = {Rosja Mastop},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.274-287},
	Title = {Characterising Responsibility in Organisational Structures: The Problem of Many Hands},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[20],
	Abstract = {The aim of this work is to propose a model-theoretic semantics and a complete logic for the dynamics of commitments. In the first part of the article, a formalization of the concept of social commitment in STIT logic is presented. STIT is one of the most prominent formal accounts of agency. It is the logic of constructions of the form "agent $i$ sees to it that $\phi$''. In the second part, the article presents an extension of STIT logic by dynamic operators which enable to describe two basic operations on commitment: commitment creation and commitment cancelation. The logic is used to develop an axiomatic and semantic analysis of commitment change in multi-agent systems.},
	Author = {Emiliano Lorini},
	Booktitle = {DEON'10},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.288-305},
	Title = {A Logical Analysis of Commitment Dynamics},
	Year = {2010}}

@inproceedings{[21],
	Abstract = {The purpose of this contribution is to set up a language to evaluate the results of concerted action among interdependent agents against predetermined properties that we can recognise as desirable from a deontic point of view. Unlike the standard view of logics to reason about coalitionally rational action, the capacity of a set of agents to take a rational decision will be restricted to what we will call agreements, that can be seen as solution concepts to a dependence structure present in a certain game. The language will identify in concise terms those agreements that act accordingly or disaccordingly with the desirable properties arbitrarily set up in the beginning, and will reveal, by logical reasoning, a variety of structural properties of this type of collective action.},
	Author = {Paolo Turrini and Davide Grossi and Jan Broersen and John-Jules Ch. Meyer},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {Deon2010},
	Pages = {p.306-322},
	Title = {Forbidding Undesirable Agreements: A Dependence-Based Approach to the Regulation of Multi-agent Systems},
	Year = {2010}}



@proceedings{DEON2010,
	Address = {Fiesole, Italy},
	Editor = {Guido Governatori and  Giovanni Sartor},
	Month = {July 7-9},
	Publisher = {Springer},
	Title = {Proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2010)},
	Year = {2010}}



\usepackage{mathsymb}


@inproceedings{[1],
	Abstract = {The formal definition of causality raises non trivial issues in the case of several agents acting together. Several action operators are defined in the semantics of a multi modal logic. The approach which is proposed is an extension to several agents of the "bringing it about'' operators. A joint action operator is defined which holds the property of non monotonicity with respect to sets of agents. It is refined in a restricted joint operator for cases where several sets of agents cause in- dependently a state of affairs and it is extended to sets of agents who are acting indirectly.
The formal definitions are evaluated with respect to several typical case studies and a detailed comparison with other approaches based on the STIT operators is presented.},
	Author = {Robert Demolombe},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {Page: 1-15},
	Title = {Causality in the Context of Multiple Agents},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[2],
	Abstract = {Abstract normative systems allow to reason with norms even when their content is not detailed. In this paper, we propose a our preliminary results to visualize abstract normative systems, in such a way that we are able to reason with institutional facts, obligations and per- missions. Moreover, we detect meaningful patterns emerging from the proposed visualization, and we show how these patterns can be used to define commonly used reusable solutions.},
	Author = {Silvano Colombo Tosatto and Guido Boella and Leendert van der Torre and Serena Villata},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {Page: 16-30},
	Title = {Visualizing Normative Systems: An Abstract Approach},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[3],
	Abstract = {Deontic logic has extensively been used to reason about what a player (or coalition) should do when confronted with several choices at its disposal while being aware of its opponents' possibilities. So far this line of research, inspired by Horty's utilitarian account of obligations, has been focused on interpreting coalitional oughts as rational choices, going on to characterizing game-theoretical solution concepts, such as Nash equilibria. With the present contribution we would like to extend the scope of this account to include contractual aspects of coalitional choices, arguing that deontic logic can be used as a comprehensive reasoning tool for the normative aspects of game theory.},
	Author = {Paolo Turrini},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {31-45},
	Title = {Agreements as Norms},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[4],
	Abstract = {Defeasible Deontic Logic is a simple and computationally efficient approach for the representation of normative reasoning. Traditionally defeasible logics are defined proof theoretically based on the proof conditions for the logic. While several logic programming, operational and argumentation semantics have been provided for defeasible logics, possible world semantics for (modal) defeasible logics remained elusive. In this paper we address this issue.},
	Author = {Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo and Erica Calardo},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {46-60},
	Title = {Possible World Semantics for Defeasible Deontic Logic},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[5],
	Abstract = {Parametrized logic programs, for which a syntax and natural declarative semantics have been recently defined, are very expressive logic programs under the stable model semantics (also usually called answer set programs) in which complex formulas of a given parameter logic are allowed to appear in the body and head of rules. The choice of the parameter logic depends largely on the domain of the problem to be modeled.
In this paper we show how input-output logic can be embedded into parametrized logic programs, by choosing deontic logic as the parameter logic. This embedding not only shows how to recast input-out logic in this extension of answer set programming, but also sheds light on how to extend input-output logic with some interesting non-monotonic features.},
	Author = {Ricardo Gon\c{c}alves and Jos{\'e} J{\'u}lio Alferes},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {61-75},
	Title = {An Embedding of Input-Output Logic in Deontic Logic Programs},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[6],
	Abstract = {In this paper I show that one cannot faithfully represent contrary-to-duty obligations in logics with sanction semantics. In order to do so I first provide a number of desiderata that a logic should satisfy in order to represent contrary-to-duty obligations using sanction semantics. I then show that no logic satisfying all desiderata can faithfully represent contrary-to-duty obligations. Finally I show that when dropping any one of the desiderata there is a logic that satisfies all others and can represent some contrary-to-duty obligations faithfully.},
	Author = {Louwe B. Kuijer},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {76-90},
	Title = {Sanction Semantics and Contrary-to-Duty Obligations},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[7],
	Abstract = {We consider a generalised Chisholm set of contrary to duty obligations (CTD) of the form $Oq_{0}$ and for $i=0,\ldots , n $ we have the CTD is 
	$q_{i}\rightarrow Oq_{i+1}$
	$\neg q_{i}\rightarrow O \neg q_{i+1}$
	and the facts $+/- q_{j}$ for some $j$ in $\{0,1,\ldots , n+1\}$. Note that for the case of $n = 1$ and fact $\neg q_0$ we have the Chisholm paradox.
We also allow for temporal sequencing of the $q_i$ in the form that $q_{i + 1}$ may come temporally before or after $q_i$ .
We offer a representation of this problem in a variation of standard deontic logic that we call TSDL, with the standard temporal operator $\langle\rangle$ , the deontic obligation operator $O$, and the past operator $Y$ for ``yesterday''. This formalism is free of the above paradoxes. We provide an axiomatization and show it to be complete. The logic formalism enjoys the finite tree model property and hence is decidable.},
	Author = {Dov M. Gabbay},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {91-107},
	Title = {Temporal Deontic Logic for the Generalised Chisholm Set of Contrary to Duty Obligations},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[8],
	Abstract = {The aim of this work is to provide a logical analysis of moral agency. Although this concept has been extensively studied in social philosophy and in social sciences, it has been far less studied in the field of deontic logic and multi-agent systems (MASs). We discuss different aspects of moral agency such as the distinction between desires and moral values and the concept of moral agent. All these concepts are formalized in a variant of STIT logic with explicit actions.},
	Author = {Emiliano Lorini},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {108-122},
	Title = {On the Logical Foundations of Moral Agency},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[9],
	Abstract = {This paper proposes a new simulation approach for investigating phenomena such as norm emergence and internalization in large groups of learning agents. We define a probabilistic defeasible logic instantiating Dung's argumentation framework. Rules of this logic are attached to probabilities and describe the agents' minds and behaviour. We thus adopt the paradigm of reinforcement learning over this probability distribution to allow agents to adapt to their environment.},
	Author = {R{\'e}gis Riveret and Antonino Rotolo and Giovanni Sartor},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {123-138},
	Title = {Norms and Learning in Probabilistic Logic-Based Agents},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[10],
	Abstract = {This paper studies the following interpretation of obligations: A person i ought to do A in a situation S just in case everything else i may (and can) do in S is consistent with A. In such a case A can be called the weakest permission that i has in S. We show that, under this interpretation, obligation and permission are not dual notions, and that it gives rise to an interesting interplay between deontic and alethic notions. We also discuss the logics adequacy w.r.t. the paradoxes of (classic) deontic logic and provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it. We finally show that practical, rational recommendations in games provide a natural, concrete application of such an understanding of obligations and permissions.},
	Author = {Olivier Roy and Albert J. J. Anglberger and Norbert Gratzl},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {139-150},
	Title = {The Logic of Obligation as Weakest Permission - (Short Version)},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[11],
	Abstract = {We present a refinement of Anderson's reduction of deontic logic to modal logic with only alethic modalities. The refined proposal contextualizes the Andersonian sanction constant s by replacing it with a unary sanction operator S that is dependent on the concrete normative requirement that is violated. A formula S B is then for instance interpreted as ``B causes a sanction'' or as ``B provides a reason for (the applicability of) a sanction''. Due to its modified sanction operator, the resulting logic DSL invalidates some instances of the inheritance principle. This gives rise to new interesting features. For instance, DSL consistently allows for the presence of conflicting obligations. Moreover, it provides novel insights in various central `paradoxes' in deontic logic such as the Ross paradox, the paradox of the good Samaritan, and Forrester's `gentle murderer' paradox.},
	Author = {Christian Stra{\ss}er and Mathieu Beirlaen},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {151-169},
	Title = {An Andersonian Deontic Logic with Contextualized Sanctions},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[12],
	Abstract = {In this article, we propose a Dynamic Logic of Propositional Control DL-PC in which the concept of `seeing to it that' (abbreviated stit) as studied by Belnap, Horty and others can be expressed; more precisely, we capture the concept of the so-called Chellas stit theory and the deliberatibe stit theory, as opposed to Belnap's original achievement stit. In this logic, the sentence `group G sees to it that $\varphi$' is defined in terms of dynamic operators: it is paraphrased as `group G is going to execute an action now such that whatever actions the agents outside $G$ can execute at the same time, $\varphi$ is true afterwards'. We also prove that the satisfiability problem is decidable. In the second part of the article we extend DL-PC with operators modeling normative concepts, resulting in a logic $DL-PC^{Leg}$. In particular, we define the concepts of `legally seeing to it that' and `illegally seeing to it that'. We prove that the decidability result for DL-PC transfers to$ DL-PC^{Leg}$.},
	Author = {Andreas Herzig and Tiago De Lima and Emiliano Lorini and Nicolas Troquard},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {170-183},
	Title = {A Computationally Grounded Dynamic Logic of Agency, with an Application to Legal Actions},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[13],
	Abstract = {We start our investigations from the deontic action model defined in multi-situation settings. Then we discuss the validity of formulas constructed in a language with a finite number of basic actions, parallel and sequential compositions of actions, a free choice operator and the standard deontic operators of obligation, strong permission and prohibition. The main achievements of the paper are definitions of metalogical counterparts of deontic operators and interpretation function of actions taking into account their terminating and non-terminating executions.},
	Author = {Piotr Kulicki and Robert Trypuz},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {184-198},
	Title = {A Deontic Action Logic with Sequential Composition of Actions},
	Year = {2012}}

@inproceedings{[14],
	Abstract = {Norm change is one of the main challenges for normative reasoning. This discussion paper presents some novel informal and semi-formal ideas regarding the nature and formalization of norm change. First, we contrast the second-order nature of norm change with the first-order nature of obligation change. Second, we discuss how to change the normative system to avoid future obligations in the input/output logic framework, which explicitly distinguishes norms from obligations. Third, we present a semantical two dimensional view on change. Fourth, we illustrate norm change using automata changing automata. Fifth, we compare norm change with analogous mechanisms in non-normative contexts.},
	Author = {Jan Broersen and Dov M. Gabbay and Leendert van der Torre},
	Booktitle = {DEON},
	Crossref = {DBLP:conf/deon/2012},
	Pages = {199-214},
	Title = {Discussion Paper: Changing Norms Is Changing Obligation Change},
	Year = {2012}}

@proceedings{DBLP:conf/deon/2012,
	Address = {Bergen, Norway},
	Editor = {Thomas {\AA}gotnes and Jan Broersen and Dag Elgesem},
	Month = {July 16-18},
	Publisher = {Springer},
	Title = {Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science (DEON 2012)},
	Year = {2012}}